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[T]he entire criminal justice system, from citizen to judge, is governed by per-
verse incentives. Though many of its members agree on what they wish to
achieve, the incentives faced by each member acting individually directs him
or her to act in ways inconsistent with what is implied by that agreement.'
INTRODUCrION
T HIS is a piece about prosecutorial incentives in our criminal jus-
tice system and ways to reconstruct those incentives. I describe a
proposal to influence and structure a prosecutor's discretion and to
limit prosecutorial misconduct through financial incentives. More
specifically, I propose that a system of financial rewards could influ-
ence the public prosecutor's charging decisions and control
prosecutorial misconduct occurring at trial. By exploring the potential
of financial incentives as a mechanism to influence the manner in
which the prosecutor approaches the various tasks of her job, I hope
to better conceptualize the role of the public prosecutor in our crimi-
nal justice system.
The reward system I describe centers on the idea that motivating
the public prosecutor through financial incentives accommodates the
necessity for prosecutorial discretion in the American criminal justice
system, while simultaneously recognizing the importance of encourag-
ing the prosecutor to engage in conduct that exceeds constitutional
minimums. I describe a financial incentive system of individual re-
wards' for public prosecutors. In particular, I focus on altering the
incentives of federal prosecutors, though the more generalized appli-
cation of the proposal to state prosecutors probably could easily be
achieved under certain circumstances. 4
1. James Q. Wilson, Thinking About Crime 258 (2d ed. 1983).
2. There are, of course, other incentive models that could be used, such as a
group incentive model. But the individual incentive model is attractive for at least
two reasons. First, it is well documented that individual incentives are effective mo-
tivators. See John M. Greiner et al., Productivity and Motivation: A Review of State
and Local Government Initiatives 20 (1981) (noting that even the most conservative
studies show that individual incentives increase productivity 10% to 20%). Second, as
I explain in greater detail below, individual incentives can promote greater individual.
responsibility. Individual responsibility is a factor critical to the effectiveness of the
financial incentive proposal to motivate prosecutors to better follow the rules of pro-
fessional responsibility on a case-by-case basis.
3. An extended discussion of financial incentives for defense attorneys is beyond
the scope of this Article. I should like to point out that my decision to focus on
prosecutors does not mean that I believe such a system would be inapplicable to de-
fense attorneys. For innovative perspectives on providing criminal defense attorneys
with better financial incentives, see Pamela S. Karlan, Contingent Fees and Criminal
Cases, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 595 (1993) and Stephen J. Schulhofer & David D. Friedman,
Rethinking Indigent Defense: Promoting Effective Representation Through Consumer
Sovereignty and Freedom of Choice for All Criminal Defendants, 31 Am. Crim. L.
Rev. 73 (1993).
4. This Article focuses on federal prosecutors for three main reasons. First, the
individual incentive model this Article describes probably will work best if the same
actor handles the case from the beginning to end. In other words, a vertical prosecu-
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The general thesis of this Article is that financial incentives should
be considered and applied to various duties of the public prosecutor.
The Article is divided into two parts. Each part addresses how the
financial incentive system I propose has the potential to remedy two
persistent problems in our criminal justice system. Part I discusses
how the prosecutor's ability to control the dynamics of plea bargain-
ing through her vast charging discretion can compromise the criminal
defendant's ability to make a knowing and voluntary decision about
relinquishing constitutional rights. Part II addresses the tendency of
prosecutors to fail to adhere to rules of professional responsibility and
the failure of disciplinary bodies, office supervisors, and courts to
sanction prosecutors for inattention to these rules.
Part I focuses on the prosecutor's charging discretion. It describes
an incentive system that rewards individual prosecutors financially on
a case-by-case basis when that prosecutor obtains a conviction on a
charge that is very similar, if not identical, to the charge or charges the
prosecutor initially pursued against the defendant. Thus, the financial
incentives model rewards a prosecutor for constraining her charging
discretion within appropriate boundaries. Part I explains how the re-
ward system should affect the dynamics of plea bargaining by motivat-
ing the prosecutor to limit her discretion at the charging stage. The
prosecutor's ability to control the dynamics of plea bargaining is due
in large part to her ability to exercise great discretion in charging.
Prosecutors can make, and tend to make, charge selections that in-
fluence a defendant's choice to plead guilty or go to trial. Prosecutors
sometimes "overcharge"' defendants to control the dynamics of plea
bargaining. Under the rewards proposal, however, a prosecutor is re-
warded for charging the defendant only with those charges the prose-
cutor believes she can prove at trial. As a consequence, overcharging
should be reduced. Reduction of overcharging would then lead to a
context in which defendants could plead guilty voluntarily and intelli-
gently. For example, one benefit of reduced overcharging through the
reward scheme I propose is that a prosecutor's charge would become
a better signal to the defendant of the strength of the prosecution's
case against him. Thus, the charge itself would convey information to
tion structure is likely to increase substantially the model's success. Many state and
county offices are horizontally structured--different prosecutors handle a particular
case at different stages. Federal prosecuting offices, on the other hand, almost always
are organized along vertical lines. Second, the relevant case law of the federal system
is simply more accessible for analysis than the case law of numerous and diverse state
criminal justice systems. There are 94 federal districts, each of which has a U.S.
Attorney and an office of Assistant U.S. Attorneys. However, there are several thou-
sand different power centers in the states. The sheer numbers involved in the state
criminal justice systems make it difficult to generalize predictions about the efficacy of
the model of financial incentives I propose in this Article. Third, the organizational
structure of federal prosecuting offices concentrates control over charging in prosecu-
tors, as contrasted with many state systems where police control charging.
5. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
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the defendant. Consequently, under the reward system the defendant
should be able to better assess whether to elect to go to trial or to
plead guilty and forgo the right to a trial.
Part II addresses the problem of identifying and preventing
prosecutorial misconduct occurring primarily at trial. Prosecutors
often fail to adhere to rules of professional responsibility applicable to
them generally as attorneys and specifically as prosecutors. Inefficacy
of existing control mechanisms contribute to the persistence of
prosecutorial misconduct. For instance, prosecutors are immune from
civil damages for misconduct arising from their actions as advocates.
Professional disciplinary institutions such as bar associations, state
grievance committees, and prosecutorial supervisors rarely consider
prosecutorial misconduct. And courts either fail to sanction prosecu-
tors effectively, or they lack effective sanctions for prosecutorial mis-
behavior. Financial rewards could augment these weak systems.
Part II describes a model of financial incentives designed to invigor-
ate rules of professional responsibility applicable to prosecutors. The
goal of the model is to motivate prosecutors to pay more attention to
standards of behavior that are higher than the floors set by the Consti-
tution. The incentive system rewards prosecutors financially on a
case-by-case basis, provided the appellate court finds that the prosecu-
tor behaved properly. Appellate review of the prosecutor's conduct
flows naturally from the appellate court's review of the defendant's
conviction. To illustrate the predicted effects of this scheme, I use as
examples ethical rules that prohibit prosecutors from engaging in im-
proper argument at trial and rules requiring the prosecutor to disclose
to the defendant evidence that tends to negate the guilt of the ac-
cused, mitigate the degree of offense, or reduce punishment. The re-
ward system envisions that ethical rules will be invigorated because
prosecutors will be rewarded on the basis of the appellate court's de-
termination that an improper argument was made or that evidence
favorable to the defendant was withheld without regard to whether
the argument or lack of disclosure ultimately deprived the defendant
of a fair trial. Prosecutors rewarded in this way should be motivated
to comport their behavior with rules of professional responsibility
rather than the more lenient constitutional standards.
The two parts of the reward system work together to shape
prosecutorial choices and conduct occurring at important stages in a
typical case. The financial incentives described in part I are designed
to assist a prosecutor to prioritize efficiently her cases by placing a
premium on the cases in which the evidence shows that the defendant
is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. If a prosecutor knows she will
receive a reward for obtaining a conviction on a case-by-case basis,
she will tend to choose those cases from her caseload in which convic-
tion seems relatively easy to obtain based on the prosecutor's assess-
ment of the admissible evidence and potential procedural hurdles.
[Vol. 64
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Conversely, the prosecutor will tend not to choose cases in which the
evidence of guilt is not strong, the amount of admissible evidence is
scant, or the procedural hurdles are higher than she would like to
jump. By addressing the potential for prosecutorial misconduct at the
trial stage, the incentives described in part II pick up where the system
described in part I ends.
The incentive system laid out in parts I and II considers the effect of
rewarding a prosecutor on a case-by-case basis for achieving certain
standards in charging and in trial conduct. By rewarding a prosecutor
for obtaining a conviction on the same charge she pursued at the out-
set of the case, the reward system attempts to make more concrete
ethical standards concerning the prosecutor's charging discretion.
These standards are somewhat ambiguous by design so as not to inter-
fere with the discretion necessary to the prosecutor's job function
were these standards externally enforced. Encouraging higher stan-
dards of behavior through rewards is a middle ground that respects
the necessity to avoid both the articulation of concrete rules for vary-
ing and complex situations and also the problems of external enforce-
ment of standards, whether concrete or more fluid. Thus, rewards are
a good way to achieve the benefits of external enforcement of rules
while respecting the centrality of prosecutorial discretion in the Amer-
ican criminal justice system. Additionally, rewards are also useful to
aid in the external enforcement of rules of professional responsibility
that are clear but underenforced.
Finally, the incentive system set out in parts I and II is not based on
a view of prosecutors as mere wealth maximizers. Rather, these re-
wards should be effective because, by linking a reward to ethical goals,
they capitalize on a prosecutorial culture that values winning. In this
way, the rewards system I describe can act as a mechanism to shape
prosecutorial preferences 6 for good behavior within the context of the
naturally adversarial role the prosecutor plays in the criminal justice
system.
A person is more likely to perform a certain task if he is given an
incentive to do so. Similarly, we can intuit that people generally will
perform better if they are given incentives to perform at a higher
level. Following this reasoning, financial incentives have long been
used in the private sector to motivate workers towards greater pro-
ductivity;7 numerous studies indicate that individual financial incen-
6. For a related account of the criminal law as a mechanism to shape preferences,
see Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Lan, As a Pref-
erence-Shaping Policy, 1990 Duke L.. 1.
7. E. Brian Peach & Daniel A. Wren, Pay for Performance from Antiquity to the
1950s, in Pay for Performance: History, Controversy, and Evidence 5, 14-18 (Bill L
Hopkins & Thomas C. Mawhinney eds., 1992).
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tives are effective motivators.8 While it is uncontroversial that sales
executives at IBM may be paid a commission to motivate them to sell
more computer systems, the same cannot be said for injecting similar
incentive schemes into the public sector.
Skeptical attitudes towards motivating public employees with finan-
cial incentives exist for many reasons. Some laws and regulations en-
tirely prohibit or limit the use of monetary rewards for public
employees, and personnel regulations sometimes require that public
employee salaries be uniform and comparable. 9 Political constraints
also may make it difficult for entrepreneurial governments to use fi-
nancial bonuses to reward employees. 10 Perhaps the greatest obstacle
to the use of financial incentives in the public sector is the long-stand-
ing belief that it is extremely difficult or even impossible to measure
public sector output." In contrast, measuring the number of com-
puter systems sold by IBM sales executives is a relatively simple task.
The inability to measure performance can pose an insurmountable
hurdle to the development of a successful financial incentive program
for some public employees because a successful financial incentive
plan depends on an explicit relationship between the reward and the
performance desired.'" Despite these issues greater numbers of gov-
ernmental bodies, even with respect to criminal justice, are turning to
financial incentives as motivators.' 3
The additional issue of "justice" adds complexity to the equation for
public employees in the criminal justice system, especially the prose-
cutor. Justice is a term like fairness-it means different things to dif-
ferent people. It often depends on context, the individuals situated in
that context, and the background that the individuals in a particular
context bring to it. The prosecutor is expected to pursue the elusive
8. See Greiner et al., supra note 2, at 20.
9. ld. at 381-82 (stating that six states forbid such awards entirely and noting that
several others legally restrict the use of monetary awards).
10. Id. at 103 (explaining that taxpayers may perceive bonus programs as "give-
aways" of tax funds).
11. But see Marc Holzer, Public Administration Under Pressure, in Productivity
and Public Policy 71, 71 (Marc Holzer & Stuart S. Nagel eds., 1984) (suggesting that
the notion that outputs and outcomes cannot be measured in the public sector is
"baseless" and a "myth").
12. See Greiner et al., supra note 2, at 20; see also David Osborne & Ted Gaebler,
Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public
Sector 139 (1992) ("Entrepreneurial governments seek [to fund output because they]
know that when institutions are funded according to inputs they have little reason to
strive for better performance. But when [governments] are funded according to out-
comes, they become obsessive about performance.").
13. See generally Greiner et al., supra note 2, at 33-43 (describing numerous ef-
forts at the local and state government level to use financial incentives); Robert Wood
& Maria Maguire, Private Pay for Public Work: Performance Related Pay for Public
Sector Managers 123-95 (1993) (discussing case studies linking pay and performance
in the public sector of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Economic Devel-
opment countries).
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and largely undefined goal of justice while at the same time pursuing
the goal of convicting and incarcerating guilty criminal defendants to
ensure the public's safety. 4 Therefore, the goal of justice must be
considered if a system of financial incentives is to capture all of the
features of the prosecutor's job and, in so doing, spur the prosecutor
to be a better public employee. Justice must be defined before it can
be included as an assessable factor of the prosecutor's output. Of
course, this is exceedingly difficult, as there is no ready definition of
what it means for the prosecutor to do justice.
Whatever definition of justice is ultimately reached, it is not contro-
versial to say that to achieve justice, the prosecutor must strive for a
certain level of impartiality in pursuing criminal investigations and
prosecutions. And if impartiality is a necessary component to justice,
it is possible that injecting financial incentives into this context may be
inconsistent with the prosecutor's goals. A financial reward system
could introduce bias that affects the level of impartiality necessary to
the prosecutor's pursuit of justice.15
On the other hand, a financial incentive system could provide a
"correcting" bias that allows the prosecutor to achieve some notion of
justice. This is the idea I explore in this Article.
Perhaps because of the problems identified in the preceding
paragraphs, most financial incentives in the criminal justice system are
directed at private actors to influence them to assist public employees.
For example, the U.S. Secret Service is authorized to offer and pay
rewards to private citizens who provide information leading to the ap-
prehension of violators or potential violators of certain provisions of
federal law.'6 Similarly, many communities offer rewards to those
who provide information about criminal offenses that lead to convic-
14. Compare Canons of Professional Ethics Canon 5 (1908) (applied, as amended,
until the adoption of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility in 1970) ("The
primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict, but to see
that justice is done.") with Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Jus-
tice Standard 3-1.2 (1992) [hereinafter Standards for Criminal Justice], which states:
(a) The office of the prosecutor is charged with responsibility for prosecu-
tions in its jurisdiction.
(b) The prosecutor is an administrator of justice, an advocate, and an officer
of the court; the prosecutor must exercise sound discretion in the perform-
ance of his or her functions.
(c) The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict. ...
Even the Standards noted above contain some ambiguity about the prosecutor's
role-it is only in the third subpart of the first standard that the prosecutor learns of
her duty to seek justice. See id.
15. See, e.g., Hoyne v. Danisch, 106 N.E. 341, 343 (III. 1914) ("The fee system,
where the salary of the public official depends entirely upon the amount of fees col-
lected by him, is liable to result in many evils . . . ." (emphasis added)).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 3056(c)(1)(D) (1994) (allowing officers and agents of the Secret
Service, under the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, to reward persons for
providing information concerning "violation[s] or potential violation[s] of those provi-
sions of law which the Secret Service is authorized to enforce").
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tions.17 To motivate private citizens to assist the government in ferret-
ing out fraud in government contracting, Congress recently revitalized
the qui tam 8 action under the False Claims Act ("Act").' 9 Commen-
tary to the recently amended Act indicates that Congress intended "to
increase financial and other incentives to private individuals to bring
suits under the Act[, thereby] enlist[ing] the aid of the citizenry in
combating the rising problem of 'sophisticated and widespread
fraud.' "20 Each of these examples manifests a recognition on the part
of public officials that a financial incentive can be an effective part of a
law enforcement program.
Although the most numerous examples of financial incentives in the
law enforcement area are directed at private individuals, examples of
financial incentives given directly to public employees exist. Prosecu-
tors for the U.S. Department of Justice, for instance, are eligible to
receive various monetary incentive awards."z The Attorney General
may award an individual or group with the Attorney General's Award
for Exceptional Service or the Award for Distinguished Service. 2
Moreover, the Attorney General may reward individual attorneys
with the John Marshall Award.23 More commonly awarded are Spe-
cial Achievement Awards, which essentially are yearly bonuses given
to employees who achieve high performance ratings.2 4 All of these
awards are designed to emulate financial incentive programs in the
private sector by using monetary rewards to increase motivation and
17. See, e.g., Caroline M. Cooney, Hot Line to Preventing Crime, Security Mgmt.,
Sept. 1991, at 50 (discussing Crime Stopper programs in which private citizens are
rewarded for providing authorities with information that helps law enforcement agen-
cies solve crimes and noting that such rewards are usually contingent upon a convic-
tion being obtained).
18. See United States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743, 746 n.3 (9th Cir. 1993)
("The term 'qui tam' is short for 'qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se imposo se-
quitur, [or] who brings the action as well for the king as for himself.'" (citation omit-
ted)). Qui tam actions allow private litigants to maintain a civil suit on behalf of
themselves and the government to recover damages and enforce penalties prescribed
by statute. Id. at 745-46.
19. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
20. See Kelly, 9 F.3d at 745 & n.2 (quoting S. Rep. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2,
23-24 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5267, 5288-89).
21. See, e.g., Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Directive ATR 1451.1
(1990) [hereinafter ATR] (describing different types of rewards and recognizing the
Attorney General's power to grant cash awards ranging from $5000 to $10,000).
22. The Award for Exceptional Service is the highest Department of Justice
award, and the Award for Distinguished Service is the second highest. Id. § 2.1(a)-(b).
23. The John Marshall Award is granted annually in each of six areas: (1) trial of
litigation; (2) preparation of litigation; (3) support of litigation; (4) handling of ap-
peals; (5) providing legal advice or preparing litigation; (6) interagency cooperation in
support of litigation. Id. § 2.1(c).
24. See id. § 3.2(a) ("A Special Achievement Award is a lump sum cash award
granted in recognition of either: an employee's sustained performance of assigned
tasks for a period of at least six months; or a specific act or service in the public
interest connected with or related to official employment.").
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morale.l However, neither the Attorney General's Awards nor the
Special Achievement Awards are tied to specific cases or performance
in a specific area. For that reason, these rewards may not be particu-
larly controversial. Arguably, neither are they very effective."
A comparison between the Justice Department's bonus scheme for
its employees on the one hand, and its policy of financially rewarding
in a very direct manner private persons for assisting in investigations
and convictions on the other, is revealing. The differences between
the two policies might reflect the government's interest in achieving a
balance between maintaining an adequate level of law enforcement
and avoiding the compromise of justice by government employees.
That a financial incentive scheme designed to motivate the prosecutor
to be a better public employee may affect the prosecutor's goal of
justice does not mean that financial incentives should be rejected out-
right. Some effect on the prosecutor's goal of justice does not neces-
sarily mean that justice is destroyed. The effect of financial incentives
on the prosecutor's pursuit of justice may very well be a welcome
effect.
Professors Thomas W. Church and Milton Heumann have docu-
mented in a monograph one attempt to influence the manner in which
prosecutors carry out their duties through financial incentives2 7 The
Speedy Disposition Program was an ambitious financial incentive pro-
gram directed at prosecutors in New York City undertaken from 1984
to 1985. The Speedy Disposition Program utilized financial incentives
to motivate prosecutors to achieve a very specific goal, unlike the De-
partment of Justice monetary incentive program. The Speedy Dispo-
sition Program initially was spurred by a federal court order requiring
the number of detainees housed in New York jails to be decreased.
The New York City Office of Management and Budget provided the
prosecuting offices of the city's five boroughs and a Special Narcotics
office with approximately $1.5 million in seed money in 1984. In re-
turn for the seed money, the district attorneys in each of the six offices
agreed to reduce the number of older felony cases on their dockets
25. See, e.g., id § 1.3 ("The policies governing this program in the Antitrust Divi-
sion are to: (a) Assure consistency and equity in the application of criteria established
for awards; (b) Recognize employee achievements; (c) Regularly identify situations in
which employee performance warrants consideration for awards.").
26. The Special Achievement Awards dispensed during my tenure at the Depart-
ment of Justice were very small if compared on a percentage basis to an attorney's
salary. They were meted out once per year, and there was little differentation among
the evaluations of those rewarded. As Wood and Maguire note, poor discrimination
and inflation in ratings often result in universal receipt of achievement awards in gov-
ernment offices. See Wood & Maguire, supra note 13, at 35-37. Moreover, because
the Department of Justice's rewards were not tied to any particular goal, they did not
motivate the employee to meet any particular goal.
27. See Thomas W. Church & llton Heumann, Speedy Disposition: Monetary
Incentives and Policy Reform in Criminal Courts (1992) for an excellent, detailed
description of the Speedy Disposition Program.
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and the number of their offices' long-term detainees housed in pretrial
detention facilities. The program also provided that the offices most
successful in reducing the number of cases targeted by the program
would receive cash bonuses from an incentive pool of several million
dollars. The offices receiving these rewards were not required to
spend the money on further efforts to decrease the number of
targeted cases; rather, the rewards simply were bonuses for achieving
results that the city desired.28
The success of New York City's Speedy Disposition Program is
somewhat ambiguous. If the figures for pretrial detainees are ex-
amined in the aggregate across all six prosecuting offices, it seems as if
the Speedy Disposition Program was a failure.2 9 Disaggregation of
the figures for individual boroughs reveals a higher level of success.
Manhattan reduced the number of older felony cases and long-term
detainee cases, the program's target categories of cases, during both
years of the program. 30 The Bronx prosecuting office distinguished
itself in the first year of the program by making the greatest reduction
in the number of targeted cases in both categories for all offices in
both years of the program.31 Financial rewards, it seems, were effec-
tive in some cases. Later analysis of the program noted that success
was not attributable only to money; rather, one characteristic of the
successes of the program in Manhattan and to some extent in the
Bronx was the "competitive element that linked the goals of the pro-
gram to other interests of the district attorneys-financial, political,
professional. 3 2
The results of the Speedy Disposition Program suggest that finan-
cial incentives, if properly constructed, can be beneficial policy tools.
Monetary rewards change the behavior of the targets of the incentives
by providing them with the motivation to obtain desired objectives.
Moreover, monetary incentives can be used to capture certain organi-
zational goals so that targets of the incentives will be motivated to
28. Thomas Church & Milton Heumann, The Underexamined Assumptions of the
Invisible Hand: Monetary Incentives as Policy Instruments, 8 J. Pol'y Analysis &
Mgmt. 641, 645-47 (1989).
29. The number of pretrial detainees went up over the two years of the Speedy
Disposition Program from 6500 in January 1984 to 7600 in December 1985. Id. at 647.
30. Id. at 648. In 1984, Manhattan reduced the number of long-term detainee
(those detained over nine months) cases by 22% and the number of targeted pending
felony cases (those pending over eleven months) by almost 31%. The reductions for
1985 were less dramatic but still impressive. Manhattan posted reductions of 11% in
the long-term detainee (those detained between six and nine months) category in
1985 and a 15% reduction in the targeted pending felony case category (those pend-
ing between six and eleven months) for the same time period.
31. In 1984, the prosecuting office in the Bronx posted the largest reductions for
any county during the two years of the program, a 38.6% reduction in detainee cases
and a 46.1% reduction in pending felony cases. However, the Bronx performed
poorly the following year, posting significant increases in both targeted categories that
essentially canceled out the gains made in the previous year. Id.
32. Id. at 654.
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view those goals as priorities. By capturing organizational goals with
financial incentives directed toward individuals, organizational leaders
can encourage individuals to internalize organizational goals. This in-
ternalization should flow naturally from the alignment of the goal and
the target's personal interest in obtaining a financial reward. In short,
motivating a prosecutor to behave ethically might be achieved simply
by explicitly rewarding the prosecutor to do so.
Alignment of organizational goals with financial rewards is not
enough to achieve internalization. Targets of incentives also must
have the capacity to attain desired objectives specified by a reward
scheme. Capacity, both the expertise or know-how to obtain the de-
sired goal and the material resources to do so, 33 is critical to any
scheme of financial incentives. As I explain in greater detail below,
many problems resulting from certain types of prosecutorial behavior
and decision making exist primarily because the existing system does
not provide incentives for prosecutors to change their behavior. Pros-
ecutors often will act contrary to the American Bar Association's
("ABA") ethical canon's mandate to seek justice and not convictions.
Prosecutors have the capacity to attain what I describe as desired be-
havior, but the current culture in which prosecutors operate simply
does not place a premium on this behavior.
I. THE PROSECUTOR'S SELECTION OF THE CHARGE AND PLEA
BARGAINING
The American prosecutor requires a great deal of discretion in or-
der to carry out her duties effectively. Prosecutors regularly use their
vast discretion to influence and control the decisions made by criminal
defendants. In this part, I explain how financial incentives could influ-
ence the prosecutor's discretion. Part I has four sections. Section A,
after summarizing the extent of prosecutorial discretion in the Ameri-
can criminal justice system, analyzes how this discretion allows the
prosecutor to manipulate the charging decision to control the defend-
ant's decision to plead guilty or go to trial. Section A then explains
how the practice affects the defendant's ability to elect voluntarily to
waive his right to trial. Section B outlines a proposal to inject a sys-
tem of financial incentives into the factors the prosecutor regularly
considers when making the decision to charge an accused with a crimi-
nal offense. Section C evaluates the predicted effects of the proposal
on the relationship between the prosecutor and the defendant during
plea bargaining and also on the criminal justice system generally. Sec-
tion C demonstrates that a system of financial incentives could be
used to influence the prosecutor's charge selection, leading to greater
33. Church and Heumant write, "Capacity can be assessed in two contexts: re-
sources and technology. Resources are the material and human wherewithal neces-
sary to achieve the policy aim. Technology involves the competence, information, and
expertise to achieve the desired results." Id at 643.
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equity between the bargaining positions of the prosecutor and the de-
fendant. Finally, section D answers several potential objections to the
financial incentive system proposed in section B.
A. Prosecutorial Discretion and Plea Bargaining
The prosecutor's decision to charge an accused is largely subject to
the prosecutor's discretion. The prosecutor's charging discretion is,
for the most part, unreviewable. So long as the prosecutor has prob-
able cause to believe that the accused committed an offense, the pros-
ecutor is entitled to bring the charge.34 The prosecutor's decision,
moreover, is rarely second-guessed by the courts. Similarly, the
prosecutor's decision not to initiate a prosecution or to dismiss a pros-
ecution is effectively unreviewable by the courts.36
34. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (" '[S]o long as the prosecutor
has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by stat-
ute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before
a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.'" (quoting Bordenkircher v.
Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978)) (alteration in original)).
35. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607-08. One area in which courts will second-guess prose-
cutors is selective prosecution, which is prohibited. Wayte sets out a two-prong test
for a prima facie case of selective prosecution. First, the defendant must show that
other similarly situated persons generally had not been prosecuted. Second, the de-
fendant must show that the government's discriminatory selection was based on con-
stitutionally impermissible grounds such as race or religion. Id. at 608-09. Few
defendants successfully raise the defense because a prosecutor usually can claim she
made her prosecuting decision in good faith, based on noninvidious grounds. See
Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962) ("[T]he conscious exercise of some selectivity
in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation.").
A prosecutor also is prohibited from initiating vindictive prosecutions. In
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974), the Court held that the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the government from bringing more serious
charges against the defendant after he has invoked his right to a jury trial, unless the
prosecutor comes forward with evidence to show that the increased charges could not
have been brought before the defendant exercised his rights. Id. at 28-29 & n.7. Like
a claim of selective prosecution, a claim of vindictive prosecution is extremely difficult
for a defendant to raise successfully.
36. See, e.g., Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375,
376-77 (2d Cir. 1973) (affirming district court's dismissal of a class action complaint
seeking to require federal and state officials to investigate and prosecute person who
allegedly violated federal and state criminal statutes in their treatment of inmates
following the Attica prison uprising); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th
Cir.) (upholding U.S. Attorney's refusal to prepare an indictment at request of grandjury), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965); see also Richard S. Frase, The Decision to File
Federal Criminal Charges: A Quantitative Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 47 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 246, 299 (1980) (stating that "the courts will almost never intervene to
compel prosecution of a given offender").
Furthermore, though Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a) ostensibly provides
for judicial review of the prosecutor's decision to dismiss a case, courts rarely will
exercise the power of refusing to allow U.S. Attorneys to dismiss cases absent a show-
ing that the dismissal is clearly contrary to a manifest public interest. United States v.
Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 513 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976).
There may be internal constraints on the prosecutor's decisions. At the federal
level the prosecutor's charging discretion is regulated to a certain extent by Depart-
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The reasons underlying the prosecutor's vast discretion have been
well documented by commentators, 37 and I will not elaborate on them
at length here. The three most commonly cited reasons are legislative
"overcriminalization, '' 38 the need for prosecutors to shepherd limited
resources,39 and the need for individualized justice.4" I note these
common justifications merely to point out that the prosecutor's discre-
tion is well-entrenched in the criminal justice system. Therefore, any
reform of the system potentially could be subsumed by the prosecu-
tor's discretion. Similar observations have led other scholars to sug-
gest that reform of the existing system rarely will be successful, and
transformation to an entirely different model is necessary.4' I am not
such a pessimist. My goal here is to suggest methods to motivate pros-
ecutors towards self-limitation in their decision making and in their
conduct within the confines of the existing system.
The prosecutor's vast charging discretion necessarily translates into
power in the plea bargaining context. The prosecutor can, and regu-
larly does, use discretion in charging to influence greatly a defendant's
decision to plead guilty in any particular case.42 The prosecutor's de-
cision to initiate a prosecution determines whether the accused will
face any punishment at all. Once a prosecution is initiated, the prose-
cutor can manipulate the offenses on which to charge the accused to
control the defendant's exposure to punishment. By controlling the
defendant's exposure to punishment, the prosecutor is able to control
the dynamics of plea bargaining. That approximately eighty to ninety
ment of Justice policy, which directs U.S. Attorneys to seek approval before pursuing
or declining the prosecution of certain offenses. See generally Harry I. Subin et al.,
The Criminal Process: Prosecution and Defense Functions § 5.1 (1993) (noting policy
controls on charging discretion cited in the U.S. Department of Justice Manual).
37. See Wayne R. LaFave, The Prosecutor's Discretion in the United States, 18 Am.
J. Comp. L. 532 (1970). For two more critical looks at the discretion of the prosecutor
in the American criminal justice system, see Kenneth C. Davis, Discretionary Justice:
A Preliminary Inquiry 188-214 (1969) and James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of
Prosecutorial Power, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1521 (1981).
38. That is, criminal codes sometimes criminalize conduct without reference to en-
forceability. In this way criminal codes at times reflect prevailing social norms more
so than conduct the legislature actually intends to prohibit. A prosecutor, then, is said
to require discretion in order to decline to prosecute such offenses. That the crime of
fornication is still included in the Illinois criminal code, I11. Ann. Stat. ch. 720, para. 51
11-8 (Smith-Hurd 1993), is a prototypical example of overcriminalization.
39. Limited resources require the prosecutor to act as a sieve and to direct atten-
tion only to a fraction of criminal conduct. It is the criminal justice system's version of
medical triage.
40. See Herbert L. Packer, 7wo Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. Pa. L Rev.
1, 27 (1964) ("A totally efficient system of crime control would be a totally repressive
one since it would require a total suspension of rights of privacy.").
41. See Davis, supra note 37, at 191-95.
42. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 50, 52-53 (1968) (discussing the prosecutor's discretionary role in plea bar-
gaining); Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U. I. L. Rev. 37, 38 (arguing that "the prosecutor sub-
stantially dictates the terms of plea agreements in most cases").
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percent of convictions are obtained through guilty pleas43 leads ines-
capably to the conclusion that the prosecutor greatly affects a very
important component of the criminal justice system.
There are few rules of professional responsibility to guide the prose-
cutor's decision making in the plea bargaining arena. It is clearly un-
ethical for a prosecutor to charge an accused with offenses for which
the prosecutor knows there is no factual basis. The ABA's Model
Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules") Rule 3.8(a) provides
that "[t]he prosecutor in a criminal case shall ... refrain from prose-
cuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by prob-
able cause."" However, the ethical rules do not clearly prohibit the
prosecutor from deciding to charge an accused with offenses which the
prosecutor has probable cause to believe are factually justified but
which the prosecutor believes she probably will not be able to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt at trial. ABA ethical standards specifically
geared to the prosecutor's function discourage this type of overcharg-
ing, but they do not prohibit it.45 Similarly, a prosecutor who pos-
sesses enough admissible evidence to pursue successfully a
prosecution on a certain serious offense against an accused but who
nevertheless is willing to accept a guilty plea to a less serious offense is
not proscribed by the ethical rules from charging the accused with the
43. See, for example, statistics collected by the Department of Justice Bureau of
Statistics, indicating that the mean rate of convictions by plea of guilty obtained in
federal courts from 1985 through 1990 was 87.2%. Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 1992, tbl. 5.35 (Kathleen
Maguire et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics].
44. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.8(a) (1983) [hereinafter Model
Rules] (emphasis added).
45. See Standards for Criminal Justice, supra note 14, Standard 3-3.9(a) ("A pros-
ecutor should not institute, cause to be instituted, or permit the continued pendency
of criminal charges when the prosecutor knows that the charges are not supported by
probable cause. A prosecutor should not institute, or cause to be instituted, or permit
the continued pendency of criminal charges in the absence of sufficient admissible
evidence to support a conviction." (emphasis added)). There may be internal office
policy which constrains this type of charging. The Standards for Criminal Justice are
exactly that-standards. Standard 3-1.1 states that they are not "intended to be used
as criteria for the judicial evaluation of alleged misconduct of the prosecutor to deter-
mine the validity of a conviction." Id. Standard 3-1.1. The same Standard also states
that the Prosecution Standards "may or may not be relevant in such judicial evalua-
tion, depending upon all the circumstances." Id. In fact, judges have referred to the
Standards in published opinions in their evaluations of alleged prosecutorial miscon-
duct and brought up by the defendant on appeal. See, e.g., Davis v. Kemp, 829 F.2d
1522, 1536 (1lth Cir. 1987) (agreeing with defendant that prosecutor's arguments may
well have violated ABA Standards for Criminal Justice even though they did not
render defendant's trial fundamentally unfair), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 929 (1988);
United States v. Birdman, 602 F.2d 547, 552 n.11 (3d Cir. 1979) (noting that a local
court rule provided that the ABA's ethical guidelines, including the ABA Standards
for Criminal Justice, were the standards of conduct for attorneys in that court), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1032 (1980); Malley v. Manson, 547 F.2d 25, 28-29 (2d Cir. 1976)
(district court held that prosecutor's conduct violated ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice such that granting of habeas writ was justified, but court of appeals reversed),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 918 (1977).
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more serious offense to induce the defendant to plead guilty to the
lesser offense.'
Each of the charging practices described in the preceding para-
graph47 could be characterized as overcharging. While all three of
these charging practices affect the defendant's ability to waive mean-
ingfully and voluntarily his right to trial in some way, arguably only
the first two detrimentally affect the defendant. The third charging
practice might generously be interpreted to be an inducement to the
defendant to plead guilty because the practice allows the defendant to
escape a sentence that could be imposed at trial that the defendant
seemingly "deserves" on the evidence and that is more harsh, no
doubt, than the sentence the defendant receives after pleading. Thus,
the inducement is hardly contrary to the defendant's desires. Even
though the third charging practice may not be contrary to the defend-
ant's interests, it is nonetheless problematic. The public may desire
that the defendant be convicted and punished on the more serious
charge, a charge on which the prosecution indisputably can succeed in
obtaining a conviction. We can better characterize the third charging
practice by recognizing it as a manifestation of an agency problem that
can exist between the prosecutor and the public (the prosecutor's "cli-
ent"), as opposed to a practice that affects the defendant's right to
meaningfully and voluntarily waive his right to trial.
Vast prosecutorial discretion at the charging stage allows the prose-
cutor to control the plea context because it enables her to trade on the
continuum between the quantity and quality of evidence necessary to
support a legitimate charge and the quantity and quality of evidence
needed to prove that the defendant committed the charged offense.
In short, there is a natural gap between the different standards of
proof necessary to support an ethical charge and the standard of proof
required to obtain a conviction at trial.
According to ethical rules, if a prosecutor can demonstrate that she
has probable cause to believe that the accused committed the charged
offense, then that charge is legitimate and ethical.'8 To meet this
probable cause standard, a prosecutor may rely on evidence that
46. In fact, the Supreme Court has expressly acknowledged the legitimacy of this
practice. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364-65 (1978) (affirming defend-
ant's sentence to life in prison on a habitual offender charge which the prosecutor
pursued after the defendant refused the prosecutor's offer to allow him to plead guilty
to a charge with a penalty limit of five years).
47. These three charging practices are: (1) charging an offense with no factual
basis; (2) charging an offense with probable cause to believe it is factually justified,
even though the offense probably cannot be proved at trial; and (3) charging a serious
offense that will likely lead to a conviction at trial in order to induce a plea to a lesser
offense.
48. See Model Rules, supra note 44, Rule 3.8(a); see also Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility DR 7-103(A) (1981) [hereinafter Model Code] ("A public pros-
ecutor ... shall not institute ... criminal charges when he knows or it is obvious that
the charges are not supported by probable cause.").
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might never be admissible at trial.49 Of course, if a prosecutor wants
to obtain a conviction against the defendant on the same offense, the
prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the charged offense. To meet this burden the prosecutor
must observe strict rules of evidence that often preclude her from
showing to the jury evidence that bears directly on the defendant's
guilt.50
Therefore, the gap between the evidentiary requirements for legally
adequate charges and convictions has been used to justify the wide
discretion afforded to prosecutors as necessary to carry out effectively
their responsibilities as prosecutors. The following argument can be
made. A lower evidentiary standard is necessary to ensure public
safety because some threshold must be met to respect simultaneously
the interests of two different groups: those who are accused of crimes
and those who are victimized or may be victimized. Requiring only
probable cause to pursue a prosecution while requiring a much higher
evidentiary standard to convict the accused later in the case strikes a
balance between the interests of the two groups. Prosecutors and
other law enforcement agents cannot be legally required to meet the
evidentiary requirement for convictions at the charging stage, the ar-
gument continues, because law enforcement agents need flexibility to
investigate alleged offenses and to pursue prosecutions only in those
cases in which prosecution is most warranted.
The argument for discretion and flexibility is persuasive, but flexi-
bility is purchased at a price. Vast prosecutorial discretion at the
charging stage undeniably leads to negative consequences on the crim-
inal defendant's ability to elect freely and intelligently to plead guilty
to the charges presented by the prosecutor. Vast prosecutorial discre-
tion allows the prosecutor to control, essentially unilaterally, the de-
fendant's ability to plead guilty in most cases.
Despite the Supreme Court's characterization of plea bargaining as
"the mutuality of advantage" by "give-and-take,"'51 the incentives fac-
ing the different characters (prosecutor, defendant, defense counsel)
in the plea bargaining drama combine to set the stage for
prosecutorial control of the outcome. Initially, through exercise of
discretion, prosecutors control the sample of cases to be bargained
over because the prosecutor, before she decides what criminal of-
49. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 4(b) ("The finding of probable cause may be based upon
hearsay evidence in whole or in part.").
50. For example, the exclusionary doctrine prohibits juries from hearing evidence
that is the fruit of an illegal search or confession obtained in violation of Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Also, evidence that tends to show that a defendant is
guilty simply because he committed similar acts before usually is excluded at trial.
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Furthermore, the jury is prohibited from hearing certain types
of hearsay that do not fit an exception to the rule against the use of hearsay. Fed. R.
Evid. 802.
51. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978).
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fenses to pursue against the accused, must first decide whether to
charge the accused at all. A prosecutor will naturally select the
stronger cases to charge. 2
The criminal defendant's decision-making process also is conducive
to unilateral control of plea bargaining by prosecutors. Criminal de-
fendants are aware that they may face more severe penalties if they
elect to go to trial on a particular offense, as compared to the penalty
they may face if they plead guilty to the same offense. One commen-
tator refers to this phenomenon as the "trial penalty. ' 53 Depending
on the sentence differential that the defendant perceives, it might be
very difficult for a risk-averse defendant to turn down a small, definite
punishment in the face of the future possibility of a much larger one.
A few theories help to explain how a criminal defendant chooses
between the following three outcomes: (1) a certain punishment now;
(2) a more serious punishment in the future after a trial, which is less
certain than the plea bargained penalty; and (3) a possible acquittal on
some or all of the charges. First, a criminal defendant's preference for
a certain penalty now against the future possibility of a larger punish-
ment after a trial could be due, in part, to the fact that choosing trial
simply prolongs uncertainty of the outcome, whatever that outcome is.
A defendant could prefer a certain punishment offered by the prose-
cutor to a high likelihood of the same punishment after the trial.'
Second, a criminal defendant may irrationally misperceive the future
benefits of acquittal because he might irrationally discount the fu-
ture.55 Irrational discounting of the benefits of a possible acquittal on
some or all of the offenses on which a defendant is charged may lead
that defendant to choose the "benefits" of a certain punishment now.
Third, a criminal defendant might "overvalue" the detriment of the
52. This is exactly the type of discretion that we would expect the prosecutor to
exercise due to the combination of factors that lead to the necessity of prosecutorial
discretion in the American criminal justice system (legislative overcriminalization,
limited resources, and individualized equitable considerations). Moreover, it has
been recognized that prosecutors as a group tend to be risk averse and seek means to
avoid embarrassing losses at trial. See Alschuler, supra note 42, at 59-60; Welsh S.
White, A Proposal for Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process, 119 U. Pa. L Rev. 439,
445-48 (1971). Obviously, by selecting stronger cases at the outset, a prosecutor
skews the relevant sample of cases in her favor.
53. See Gifford, supra note 42, at 46-47.
54. Compare the problem posed in Richard H. Thaler, The Psychology of Choice
and the Assumptions of Economics, in Quasi-Rational Economics 137, 145 (1987),
illustrating the "certainty effect":
Problem 9. Which of the following options do you prefer?
A. A sure win of $30 (78%)
B. An 80% chance to win $45 (22%)
The high frequency of responses in category A violates expected utility theory, which
predicts that a rational person should be indifferent between A and B.
55. See Jon Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences 42-51 (1989) (explaining
that the more distant in time a reward will be received in the future, the lower its
present value).
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future penalty after trial as compared to the future benefit of acquit-
tal. The value function described by scholars of prospect theory ex-
plains the observation that many people tend to place a higher value
on negative outcomes than positive outcomes of the same magni-
tude.56 It might be that defendants whose choices conform to pros-
pect theory's value function might be unable to estimate reasonably
the probability that they will receive a particular punishment in the
future after a trial. That is, because prospect theory says that the
value function is steeper for losses than for gains, defendants might
make mistakes in assessing the likelihood of success (the probability
of acquittal or lesser punishment) at trial by failing to recognize the
value of an acquittal as compared to the disadvantage of a conviction.
All of these theories may combine to affect detrimentally a criminal
defendant's ability to waive his right to trial voluntarily and intelli-
gently because all three affect the defendant's ability to assess accu-
rately the benefits and risks of going to trial.
Another factor that supports the prosecutor's ability to control uni-
laterally the dynamics of plea bargaining is the fact that a prosecutor
can exacerbate the defendant's fear of the trial penalty by utilizing an
"overcharging" strategy.5 7 A prosecutor commonly overcharges in
two ways. A prosecutor can charge a defendant with an offense more
serious than the prosecutor believes is justified ("vertical overcharg-
ing"), or a prosecutor can charge a defendant with every offense that
the prosecutor believes the defendant's conduct meets ("horizontal
overcharging"). 58 Also known as horizontal overcharging is the prac-
tice of breaking the defendant's conduct into several separate compo-
nents, charging each component as a separate offense.5 9
Overcharging is systemic. It flows from the structure of criminal
law that facilitates this charging practice because many categories of
crime contain lesser-included offenses and because the same criminal
conduct is described by different overlapping offenses. The practice of
overcharging also flows from the discrepancy between the amount of
56. One characteristic of the value function is that the function is steeper for losses
than for gains. Moreover, the function is concave for gains and convex for losses.
Thus, "The aggravation that one experiences in losing a sum of money appears to be
greater than the pleasure associated with gaining the same amount." Richard H. Tha-
ler, Toward A Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, in Quasi-Rational Economics 3,
5-7 (1987). Although the example pertains to monetary gains and losses, the theory
can be applied to a context involving gains and losses of freedom or punishment
generally.
57. See Alschuler, supra note 42, at 85-105; Gifford, supra note 42, at 47-49; see
also Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical
Study of Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 501, 539, 548 (1992) (explaining that Assistant U.S. Attorneys regu-
larly drop excess robbery counts in return for pleas and reduce drug counts down to
telephone counts).
58. See Alschuler, supra note 42, at 85-88 (describing the two types of
overcharging).
59. Id.
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information the prosecutor has at the outset of the case and what the
prosecutor expects to be able to prove at trial. Because the prosecu-
tor may not have as much information as she would like at the charg-
ing stage, she may often believe that it is in her best interests to charge
the defendant with the most serious and as many crimes at the outset
of the case to preserve options for prosecution at a later time.
Overcharging is also due in part to an abhorrence of losing that is
central to prosecutorial culture.6 0 By charging the defendant with the
most serious offenses that the prosecutor believes the defendant's
conduct supports, the prosecutor can push up the trial penalty and
limit, as a consequence, the defendant's ability to waive his right to
trial intelligently and voluntarily. A defendant, choosing between (1)
a prosecutor's offer to allow him to plead guilty to fewer than the
charged offenses (and a correlative diminution of a penalty) or to al-
low him to plead to offenses less serious than the charged offense (also
with a correlative diminution of possible exposure to punishment) and
(2) an offer to go to trial on all charges (with the correlative possibility
of maximum exposure to penalty), will, not surprisingly, often accept
the plea. This is especially true in cases in which the defendant be-
lieves that conviction on at least some charge is virtually certain.
Finally, defense counsel sometimes contribute to prosecutorial con-
trol of plea bargaining at the defendant's expense. Defense counsel
may believe it is in her best interests to go along with a prosecutorially
orchestrated plea.61 A heavy caseload and the prospect of a continu-
ing relationship with the prosecutor in the future sometimes leads the
defense counsel to agree to a plea on the prosecutor's terms. Defense
counsel's acquiescence and a prosecutor's overcharging practice can
lead to a situation in which defense counsel is able to represent to a
client that a bargain was obtained simply because the prosecutor came
down from the maximum. In fact, the "bargain" may be illusory.
The prosecutor's ability to almost wholly control plea bargaining,
along with other factors, understandably has led some scholars to ad-
vocate the reform of plea bargaining.6' Other scholars have engaged
in more extended analyses to justify the complete abolition of plea
bargaining.63 There are several arguments against plea bargaining:
60. See Dr. George T. Felkenes, The Prosecutor: A Look at Reality, 7 Sw. U. L
Rev. 98, 119 (1975) (describing the conviction mentality of prosecutors).
61. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion As Regulatory System,
17 J. Legal Stud. 43, 53-56 (1988) (explaining that defense counsel compensation sys-
tens often motivate criminal defense attorneys toward quick disposition of cases,
leading to a preference for plea bargains over trials).
62. See, eg., Gifford, supra note 42, at 74-95 (recommending implementation of a
administrative review system); White, supra note 52, at 453-62 (recommending inter-
nal controls).
63. Albert Alschuler and Stephen Schulhofer, two wel-known critics of plea bar-
gaining, have written numerous articles advocating the abolition of plea bargaining.
See Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 Yale L.
1909, 1909 n.4 (1992) (recognizing Albert Alschuler and Stephen Schulhofer as the
1995]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
plea bargaining essentially "coerces" the defendant to relinquish im-
portant constitutional rights6' (even perhaps an innocent defendant);
plea bargains are an inadequate substitute for the trial process and
ultimately undermine the public's interest in the trial process; 65 plea
bargaining interferes with the victim's right to participate in a trial;66
and plea bargaining controlled by prosecutors may lead to unequal
treatment of defendants and may undermine sentencing legislation.67
In contrast to the arguments against plea bargaining, many of the
arguments in favor often seem to have the tenor of resigned accept-
ance.68 Here I take a centrist view that recognizes both the very seri-
ous problems associated with plea bargaining and the potential
benefits of plea bargaining if bargaining positions of the prosecutor
and the defendant are relatively equal. Admittedly, this atmosphere
does not always, if ever, exist.69 To that end I propose a model that
would limit prosecutorial discretion at the charging stage in order to
promote greater equity between the prosecutor and the defendant in
the plea bargaining context. One of the goals of the financial incen-
tives model that I propose is to create an atmosphere that would pro-
mote the defendant's ability to plead guilty both voluntarily and
intelligently.
What do I mean by voluntary and intelligent decisions about pleas?
In Brady v. United States,7" the Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of a plea encouraged by the fear of a possible death sentence.
most influential critics of plea bargaining, citing their numerous articles on the sub-ject, and recognizing that other scholars have joined them in their opposition to plea
bargaining).
64. See Gifford, supra note 42, at 58-59; Schulhofer, supra note 61, at 70-74.
65. See Gifford, supra note 42, at 70-71. Gifford explains that society has a desire
to reinforce socially desirable norms, important constitutional values, and participate
in a ritual of retribution. Trials are more effective vehicles than plea bargains to sat-
isfy these objectives. Direct public input by citizens in the form of a public trial also
legitimizes state condemnation of the defendant. Id.
66. Id.
67. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for
Less Aggregation, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 901, 926-28 (1991); Schulhofer, supra note 61, at
67-70.
68. See, e.g., Thomas W. Church, Jr., In Defense of "Bargain Justice," 13 L. &
Soc'y Rev. 509, 513 (1979) (arguing that plea bargaining need not be unfair to either
the defendant nor the public).
69. See, e.g., id at 512-13. Church argues that plea bargaining need not be unfair
to either the defendant nor the public provided that four basic requirements are met:
(1) The defendant must always have the alternative of a jury trial at which
both verdict and sentence are determined and can be justified solely on the
merits of the case. (2) The defendant must be represented throughout nego-
tiations by competent counsel. (3) Both defense and prosecution must have
equal access to all available information likely to bear on the outcome of the
case should it go to trial. (4) Both should possess sufficient resources to take
the case to trial if an acceptable agreement does not result from the
negotiations.
Id.
70. 397 U.S. 742, 745 (1970).
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The Brady Court said that the plea was legal because it was both vol-
untary and intelligent.71 After Brady it is difficult to imagine a plea
that would not be voluntary. A group of people with diverse opinions
about the validity of guilty pleas probably could easily reach a consen-
sus if such a group were asked whether a plea induced by physically
violent torture was voluntary. I have little doubt that the diverse
group would conclude that such a plea was involuntary. Aside from
this easy example, voluntariness is more difficult to evaluate.72
The interpretation of voluntariness is further muddied by the fact
that voluntariness takes on different meanings in the criminal justice
system, depending on the context. Courts have settled on a standard
for voluntariness in the plea context that is different from the standard
in the confession context.O The voluntariness standard for confes-
sions is much more stringent than that for voluntariness of plea
bargains. Brain v. United States explicitly states that confessions ex-
tracted by implied promises are impermissible. 74 However, an implied
promise in the form of a reduced sentence in exchange for the defend-
ant's agreement to waive his right to trial is the acceptable norm in the
plea bargaining context.75 Courts have justified the difference be-
tween the two standards by looking to the fact that the defendant who
pleads guilty does so in open court where he can be protected by a
judge who can assess the plea's voluntariness, unlike the defendant
who confesses. The defendant who confesses may be susceptible to
self-incrimination while in police custody and away from family,
friends, and legal counsel.76 Moreover, courts may be concerned that
an illegally obtained confession might illegitimately interfere vith the
jury's determination of the defendant's guilt. In contrast, the defend-
ant presumably has accepted guilt by the time he makes a plea.
71. Id. at 758.
72. One scholar has suggested that modem prosecutorial inducements to the crim-
inal defendant to plead guilty are much like medieval proof systems that relied on
torture to coerce confessions. John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 3 (1978).
73. See Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897) (holding that the ad-
missibility of a confession depends upon whether it is free and voluntary, the "confes-
sion ... must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any
direct or implied promises, however sligh4 nor by the exertion of any improper influ-
ence." (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). Voluntariness for pleas is evaluated
under the standard set out in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742,755 (1970) (stating
that a plea entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences must stand, unless a
very narrow set of circumstances is present).
74. Brain, 168 U.S. at 542-43.
75. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 358 (1978).
76. See, e.g., Brady, 397 U.S. at 754 ("Bram dealt with a confession given by a
defendant in custody, alone and unrepresented by counsel. In such circumstances,
even a mild promise of leniency was deemed sufficient to bar the confession, not
because the promise was an illegal act as such, but because defendants at such times
are too sensitive to inducement and the possible impact on them too great to ignore
and too difficult to assess.").
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The Brady Court's requirement that a plea be both voluntary and
intelligent implies that the two standards are independent. However,
the voluntariness standard for pleas is difficult to understand as a sep-
arate notion from intelligence. Courts sometimes use yardsticks to
evaluate voluntariness of a plea that seem to be better characterized
as evaluations of the intelligence of the plea. For example, counseled
pleas are more likely to be found voluntary than uncounseled pleas. 7
The implicit assumption is that a counseled defendant is more likely to
be informed about legal standards, possible sentences, and the likeli-
hood of prevailing at trial than the uncounseled defendant. More-
over, there is an assumption that this information increases the
likelihood that the counseled defendant is making a voluntary choice
to waive his right to trial. A court's reliance on whether a defendant's
plea is counseled as a critical factor to determine whether the plea is
voluntary makes sense only if there is a very strong correlation be-
tween intelligence and voluntariness. This suggests that the two fac-
tors are interrelated and not independent. From this analysis we can
infer that if the defendant has more information about his case, it is
more likely that his decision about waiving his constitutional rights
will be voluntary.
There is an existing structure of procedures designed to protect the
defendant's ability to elect intelligently and voluntarily to plead guilty
and waive the right to trial. The Supreme Court's decisions in this
area require the trial judge to ask the defendant a routine litany of
questions to ensure that the defendant's plea is voluntarily and intelli-
gently made.7" These decisions are reflected in the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.7 9 So long as the trial judge engages in the litany
of questions and receives satisfactory answers from the defendant, the
plea is deemed voluntary and intelligent; there is no deeper investiga-
tion by the court into practices that the government may have en-
gaged in to obtain that plea. If anything, the courts implicitly assent to
a great deal of governmental influence.80 Section C explains in
77. See Ray v. Rose, 491 F.2d 285, 290 (6th Cir.) ("In recent cases in which the
Supreme Court has found guilty pleas to be voluntary, it has assiduously pointed to
the presence of competent counsel." (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 756
(1970))), cert denied, 417 U.S. 936 (1974); Dorrough v. United States, 385 F.2d 887,
890 (5th Cir. 1967) (explaining that a more exacting inquiry into the voluntariness of
the plea should be made when defendant is uncounseled), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1019
(1969).
78. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 743 & n.2; Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 240-41
(1969).
79. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d) ("The court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere without first, by addressing the defendant personally in open court, deter-
mining that the plea is voluntary and not the result of force or threats or of promises
apart from a plea agreement.").
80. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 784 (1970) ("As long as counsel is
present when the defendant pleads, the Court is apparently willing to assume that the
government may inject virtually any influence into the process of deciding on a plea."
(Brennan, J., dissenting)).
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greater detail the problems that exist in the current system despite
procedures constructed to insure voluntariness of a plea. Section C
also explains how the financial reward system set out in the next sec-
tion could ameliorate some of these problems.
B. Financial Incentives to Control Prosecutorial Charging Decisions
Even if the procedures that are in place are enough to ensure that
the defendant's rights are protected at a constitutional minimum,
problems still exist. Greater recognition of the prosecutor's ability to
control the dynamics of plea bargaining would lead to greater recogni-
tion of the impact of the prosecutor's control on the defendant's abil-
ity to plead guilty voluntarily and intelligently. Viewing plea
bargaining through the lens of the incentives facing the relevant actors
leads naturally to a focus on prosecutorial practices and the possibility
of encouraging prosecutors to change those practices so that defend-
ants may voluntarily and intelligently plead guilty.
The problems of inequity that I have identified could be remedied if
prosecutors were motivated to constrain their charging discretion in a
manner that led to the elimination of overcharging, or at least its re-
duction. An ideal charging practice would aid the defendant in intelli-
gently and voluntarily pleading guilty to the charges if he wants. In
this ideal scenario the prosecutor's ability to exert leverage over the
defendant by overcharging would be limited. Limiting the prosecu-
tor's ability to exert leverage in plea bargaining through overcharging
would, in turn, reduce the defendant's susceptibility to the trial pen-
alty and limit the defense counsel's ability to make representations to
the defendant about the sweetness of deals that may really be sour.
Moreover, such a practice also would take into account the public's
interest in effective law enforcement.
An ideal charging practice could be achieved if the prosecutor were
motivated to charge the defendant with only those offenses the prose-
cutor believed she could prove at trial and with all those offenses the
prosecutor believed she could prove at trial. The current structure of
the system does not give a prosecutor an incentive to charge in this
way. However, financial incentives could be structured to motivate
prosecutors to engage in this ideal charging practice.
I propose a model that financially rewards prosecutors for obtaining
convictions either by trial or by plea under the condition that the de-
fendant is convicted on the same charge or charges that the prosecutor
pursues at the outset of the case. Consider the following thought ex-
periment: A federal prosecutor is presented with evidence that five
grams of crack cocaine were found in a paper bag in Jane Doe's apart-
ment. Jane Doe shares her apartment with her teenaged son, John.
Officials are aware that Jane Doe's boyfriend, James Roe, sometimes
stays with her in the apartment. Both James and John have criminal
records, though James' record is longer. There is a single thumbprint
1995]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
on the paper bag. Records indicate that it belongs to James Roe. The
prosecutor must decide whether to charge James Roe with possession
or with possession with the intent to distribute. The prosecutor is
fairly certain that conviction is attainable on the possession charge,
but conviction on the trafficking charge is less certain. The prosecutor
is likely to charge James Roe with the trafficking charge in the hope of
persuading Roe to plead guilty to the lesser possession charge. The
stakes for Mr. Roe are substantial. Provided that his record does not
include previous drug or narcotic offense convictions, a conviction of
simple possession carries a maximum of one year in prison.81 How-
ever, a conviction on a trafficking charge involving five grams of crack
cocaine exposes Mr. Roe to the statutory mandatory minimum sen-
tence of five years.82 But the evidence to support the trafficking
charge is weak. Under the reward model that I propose, I predict that
the prosecutor will be motivated to charge James Roe with the offense
for which she has the most evidence-possession-rather than charge
the trafficking offense.
In this example, if James Roe pleads guilty to the simple possession
charge, the outcome in the world of rewards likely is no different from
the outcome in the world in which the prosecutor has no incentive to
refrain from overcharging. In both worlds James Roe is likely to
plead guilty. If the result in both worlds is the same, one might ask
what is the point of giving the prosecutor an incentive to limit her own
bargaining power? One difference between the two worlds is that
Roe's plea is more meaningfully voluntary and intelligent. The plea is
more meaningfully voluntary precisely because the prosecutor is moti-
vated to limit her leverage in the plea bargaining context. When she
limits her leverage in the manner prescribed by the rewards system,
her charge will tend to convey information to Roe about the strength
of her case. As I already have explained, Roe's access to information
is critical to the assessment of the voluntariness of his plea.
There are other important differences between the world of rewards
and the current state of affairs. For instance, an important feature of
the reward system I propose is that it should motivate the prosecutor
to assess her evidence at an earlier stage than she does in a world
without incentives. Additionally, in a world in which prosecutors are
motivated by financial rewards, the prosecutor should subject evi-
dence to a higher standard than the probable cause standard, the min-
imum floor for a legal, ethical charge, because a higher standard will
raise the probability that she will obtain a conviction and the reward
that follows. Because the prosecutor should make earlier and more
stringent assessments of evidence in the world of incentives, it is likely
that some cases currently charged will be set aside in a world with
81. 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
82. Id. § 841(b)(1)(B).
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rewards. Moreover, the James Roe example described above is a sim-
ple case. Only two charges were considered, and the evidence was
relatively uncomplicated. Cases in the real world are seldom so sim-
ple. It is likely that the outcomes in the more typical cases that federal
prosecutors handle in the world of rewards will be different from out-
comes that currently exist simply because most cases involve more
than one charge. Cases involving multiple charges lead inevitably to
the possibility of variegated outcomes. We should expect that charges
will be more streamlined and precise because the financial reward sys-
tem described here steers the prosecutor away from front-loading
charges and waiting to separate the wheat from the chaff.
In addition to ensuring that the prosecutor proceeds only with the
strongest cases, I predict that the reward system will have other bene-
fits. The following section points to specific examples of asymmetry
inherent to the current structure of plea bargaining that hamper the
criminal defendant's ability to relinquish his constitutional rights vol-
untarily and intelligently. Section C also explains how motivating
prosecutors to better conform their charges to the evidence they have
at the time of charging would enhance the criminal defendant's ability
to make more voluntary and intelligent decisions about pleading
guilty. In the rewards world there will be less opportunity to make
adjustments by reducing charges later in the bargaining process (be-
cause of the risk of losing the reward), so the prosecutor's tendency to
overcharge will be limited. If the prosecutor's ability to overcharge is
limited, the prosecutor's leverage against the defendant in plea bar-
gaining will be diminished.
C. Benefits of the Financial Incentives Model
One very negative side effect of the prosecutor's one-sided control
of plea bargaining situations is the tendency of some prosecutors to
exert the most pressure on defendants in weak cases. The prosecutor
may have evidence that supports her belief that the defendant com-
mitted a certain offense, but, because of procedural hurdles' or evi-
dentiary problems,84 the prosecutor's trial case may be weak. Rather
than dismiss the case, some prosecutors try to convince the defendant
83. The statutes of limitations for certain offenses often present prosecutors with a
procedural hurdle. The Department of Justice's Antitrust Division sometimes does
not learn of Sherman Act conspiracies until well after those conspiracies have ended.
During my tenure at the Justice Department, I was involved in a case in which a
person admitted his involvement in a Sherman Act conspiracy. The documentary evi-
dence corroborated his story. Unfortunately, he retired from the industry and with-
drew from the conspiracy well beyond the five-year statute of limitations. It was
therefore impossible to prosecute him, no matter the strength of the evidence against
hin.
84. The prosecutor's case may be weak because evidence critical to a successful
conviction at trial is inadmissible. Hearsay problems and illegal search problems are
examples.
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to plead guilty to some lesser charge. 5 Of course, it is precisely in
these marginal cases that the defendant has the greatest likelihood of
acquittal at trial. These cases are also the ones in which the defendant
is most likely to be induced to plea because of the influence the cer-
tainty effect, irrational discounting, and the value curve have on his
decision-making process.8 6 In other words, these cases are the cases in
which we should be most suspicious about the voluntariness of the
defendant's plea.
The reward system is designed to encourage the prosecutor to con-
form her charges to the evidence the prosecutor believes she can
prove at trial. To charge in this manner, the prosecutor must possess
enough evidence at the charging stage to support offenses on which
the accused can be convicted, not merely enough evidence to support
a charge by probable cause. In this way the system is designed to
motivate the prosecutor to subject her charging decisions to a higher
standard than the ethical rules require. Naturally, the prosecutor's ex-
isting incentive to select only the strongest cases for prosecution
should be enhanced. The prosecutor should lean towards charging
what her evidence reveals rather than charging what the evidence
might possibly reveal.87
One great benefit of a system that effectively motivates prosecutors
to refrain from overcharging defendants likely to be acquitted at trial
is that these defendants should be better distinguished from those who
are not likely to be acquitted. This can happen in two ways. First, the
prosecutor motivated by financial rewards may not bring the marginal
case at all. She will choose instead to pursue stronger cases. Second,
even if the prosecutor decides to pursue the marginal case, her charge
should be more conservative because she will otherwise risk losing the
financial incentive. She will have an incentive to constrain her discre-
tion to exert leverage against the defendant in the marginal case. As a
result, the defendant will be more likely to test the prosecutor's case
at trial, because the defendant should be more confident that he will
not face an added penalty for going to trial.88
One predicted effect of this regime is that there will be an increase
in trials in marginal cases. This is a positive outcome. The marginal
cases are the cases in which we obtain the greatest benefit from the
85. See Alschuler, supra note 42, at 60 (noting that prosecutors proceed on a "half
a loaf is better than none" philosophy).
86. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
87. There may be cases in which the evidence is not extremely strong but policy
reasons dictate that the case should be prosecuted. A date rape case or a domestic
violence case may be examples. Organizational leaders can signal the policy impor-
tance of such cases to line prosecutors by linking obtained convictions in such cases to
higher rewards. In this scenario the financial incentives motivate prosecutors to
gather more evidence to make the potentially "weak" case stronger.
88. The added penalty is, of course, the possibility of an enhanced trial penalty
flowing from overcharging.
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accuracy-enhancing procedures of the adversarial trial.' The trial
process also guarantees the defendant a greater number of constitu-
tional safeguards, which may be especially important when guilt is in
doubt.90
Charges in a world of rewards also address the potential deficien-
cies in the voluntariness of a plea by increasing the defendant's access
to information about his case. The criminal defendant does not have
the same access to information that the prosecutor does.91 More im-
portantly, the defendant does not have access to the prosecutor's in-
formation. This is due in part to rules of discovery that do not allow
the defendant to have free access to the prosecutor's information.9
Without access to information, it is difficult for the defendant to dis-
tinguish between the charges that the prosecutor can reasonably prove
at trial and those the prosecutor cannot.
The inability to investigate and build a defense is a particularly
large impediment in the cases involving poor criminal defendants. Be-
cause poor defendants comprise such a large percentage of criminal
defendants,93 the impediment of a poor defendant is a problem of the
criminal defendant generally. Poor defendants in many cases do not
have the resources to hire attorneys of their choice9l or investigators.
89. Professor Schulhofer has argued that trial is a better mechanism than plea
bargaining for resolving questions of doubtful guilt. Schulhofer, supra note 61, at 74-
77.
90. See Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in uze Guilty Plea Process,
40 Hastings LJ. 957, 997 n.114 (1989) (suggesting that trial is a method that is morally
superior to plea bargaining in cases of questionable guilt since the defendant is pro-
tected by a greater number of constitutional safeguards, as compared to the lesser
safeguards offered to the defendant who pleads guilty).
91. The prosecutor often has a distinct advantage over the defendant in her ability
to gather evidence. The prosecution may use the grand jury and the subpoena power
as investigatory tools. They may also rely on the police to identify witnesses and
obtain statements. See generally Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Proce-
dure § 19.4(a) (1984) (discussing the difficulty courts have in determining the extent
to which to allow prosecutorial discovery). Moreover, the prosecution usually has the
cooperation of citizens in obtaining evidence. See Barry Nakell, Criminal Discovery
For the Defense and The Prosecution-The Developing Constitutional Considerations,
50 N.C. L. Rev. 437, 440 (1972).
92. In contrast to rules of civil discovery, which provide for extensive mutual ex-
change of information between litigants, defendants in criminal cases often have little
access to the prosecutor's evidence prior to trial, unless the office has an open file
policy or the individual prosecutor decides to be generous. See Richard A. Rosen,
Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for "Brady" Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65
N.C. L. Rev. 693, 695 n.4 (1987). In part II of this Article, I discuss how financial
rewards might be used to motivate prosecutors to better adhere to ethical rules per-
taining to their obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defendant.
93. See Kate Stith, The Risk of Legal Error in Criminal Cases: Some Conse-
quences of the Asymmetry in the Right to Appeal, 57 U. Chli. L Rev. 1, 29 n.76 (1990).
94. See United States v. Ely, 719 F.2d 902, 904 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that the
Sixth Amendment only requires competent counsel, not counsel of the defendant's
choice), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1037 (1984); United States v. Davis, 604 F.2d 474, 478-
79 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that restriction of free choice was a necessary element of
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Instead, they are assigned public defenders, who may be underpaid
and overworked.95 Additionally, poor defendants face a higher likeli-
hood of incarceration before trial compared to other defendants be-
cause poor defendants are less likely to be able to post bail. The
inability to post bail affects a defendant's ability to select counsel of
his choice because pretrial incarceration inevitably prohibits the de-
fendant from working. Consequently, without income from a job, the
defendant may not be able to retain private counsel. And when a
criminal defendant is unable to post bail, he will be less able to assist
his counsel, private or public, in preparing and investigating the de-
fense's case.96 In contrast, defendants who post bail obviously have
greater opportunity to assist their counsel by contacting and inter-
viewing witnesses and by performing other aspects of the investigative
legwork of building a case.
The charge in the reward system would convey better information
to the defendant about the prosecutor's case than the information
conveyed in a world where prosecutors regularly overcharge. In the
reward system world the charge itself would reflect the evidence that
the prosecutor possesses, rather than notifying the defendant of mere
possibilities the defendant is unable to test. Because the charge will
reflect the offenses the prosecutor believes she can prove at trial, the
defendant will be able to make a more meaningful decision regarding
relinquishment of his right to trial than he is able to presently.
Poorer defendants should benefit from charging structured by fi-
nancial rewards because the prosecutor's one-sided control of plea
bargaining impacts poorer defendants to a greater extent than it im-
pacts wealthier defendants. 7 To put it simply, overcharging is time-
consuming and expensive for the defendant. Defense counsel must
respond to all of the prosecutor's charges in motions.98 It also takes
time to bargain the charges down to a charge or charges to which a
defendant will plead guilty-often the only ones that the prosecutor
the public defender system). But see Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 3, at 105-12
(criticizing these cases).
95. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Access to Justice for the American Underclass, The
World & I Mag., June 1991, at 463, 470-73 (explaining that most defender offices are
"swamped by a staggering caseload" and are underfunded).
96. See Richard A. Cohen, Wealth, Bail, and the Equal Protection of the Laws, 23
Vill. L. Rev. 977, 1007 (1978). Cohen notes that the detained defendant may be the
only one able to locate reluctant witnesses, and even if the defendant's attorney is
able to locate these witnesses, they may be unwilling to talk to the attorney. More-
over, a detained defendant's access to phones and other methods of communication
with the outside world is often limited. With limited access to information and assist-
ance on the outside, the detained defendant's defense is necessarily impeded. See also
Arthur R. Angel et al., Preventive Detention: An Empirical Analysis, 6 Harv. C.R.-
C.L. L. Rev. 289, 348-49 (1971) (giving statistical evidence that incarcerated defend-
ants are more likely to be found guilty than defendants who are not incarcerated).
97. See Alschuler, supra note 42, at 98 (noting the economic effects of
overcharging).
98. Id.
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believes to be justified in the first instance. If the defendant has re-
tained an attorney with his own funds, the overcharging practice may
lead to increased expenses for the defendant. If the defendant is indi-
gent, the overburdened, underpaid public defender may not have
much time to develop a counterstrategy to the charging practice. As a
result, counsel may convince the defendant to agree to a plea on the
prosecutor's terms. The problems of the indigent defendant are of
overwhelming significance to this discussion, for they comprise sev-
enty-five percent of those charged in federal cases.99
D. Answering Possible Objections to Influencing Prosecutors with
Monetary Rewards
There are many questions that must be answered in order to assess
the viability of the plan that I propose, many of them empirical. The
questions fall into two general categories. The first group of questions
are relevant to the effectiveness of the proposal itself: Are prosecu-
tors really going to be motivated by financial incentives? What kind
of financial incentives will be necessary to create the proper incen-
tives? How large should they be? The second group of questions
comes into play once we assume that the proposal will work: How, if
at all, will the system affect trial rates? Won't financial rewards moti-
vate prosecutors toward prosecuting those cases in which prosecution
is a "sure thing"? What about race and gender effects? What effect
will conviction bonuses have on prosecutorial misconduct? Won't
such bonuses induce prosecutors to engage in more misconduct simply
to acquire the financial reward?
In this section I will address some of these concerns. Some of the
questions may be impossible to answer at this point without a test
program to provide empirical data. Some of these questions, I think,
are unnecessary to answer at this time, as the primary purpose of this
work is to submit into the arena of discussion the topic of financial
incentives as a mechanism to influence the behavior of actors in the
criminal justice system.
Significant evidence indicates that the behavior of prosecutors
could be affected by financial incentives. Federal and state cases and
statutes from the turn of the century reveal that it was common to pay
prosecutors conviction fees for their services. The Supreme Court has
commented on the effectiveness of financial incentives in criminal
cases. For example, in United States v. Murphy,10 the defendants
contested the competence of an informer's testimony because the in-
former had received a portion of the monetary criminal penalty im-
99. Stith, supra note 93, at 29-30 n.76.
100. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 203 (1842).
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posed on the defendants from the U.S. Government. 10 1 The Supreme
Court praised the value of a monetary incentive as a motivator,
stating:
The case of reward is clear on the grounds of public policy, with a
view to the public interest; and because of the principle upon which
such rewards are given. The public has an interest in the suppres-
sion of crime and the conviction of guilty criminals. It is with a view
to stir up greater vigilance in apprehending, that rewards are given102
Similarly, United States v. Matthews, a case decided in 1899, concerned
the payment of rewards to deputy marshals for assisting in the arrest
and conviction of criminal offenders. 10 3 The Court again noted the
value of rewards in the criminal justice system, while explaining the
crucial difference between awards authorized by the legislature and
"sanctioned by the executive officer to whom the legislature has dele-
gated the discretion to offer the reward" and awards provided by pri-
vate individuals, which could be bribes.1°4
Supreme Court cases are not the only evidence of historical use of
financial incentives in criminal cases. In 1853, federal district attor-
neys were paid by the case, 05 much in the same way that modern
appointed defense attorneys are paid. In addition to other fees, fed-
eral prosecutors received as much as thirty dollars as a reward for
obtaining a conviction. 106 The district court bestowed the reward
upon the district attorney appearing before it,107 and a sliding scale
was applied to determine how much the prosecutor should receive. 108
State prosecutors also enjoyed the benefits of financial incentives.
State prosecutors commonly collected conviction fees payable accord-
101. Id. at 208-09.
102. Id. at 211 (quotation omitted).
103. 173 U.S. 381, 382-83 (1899).
104. Id. at 385.
105. Act of Feb. 26, 1853, ch. 80, 10 Stat. 161, 161 (providing a fee schedule for
attorneys retained to prosecute on behalf of the government, but specifically allowing
the prosecutor to have clients other than the government, the compensation from
which was not to be affected by the fee schedule).
106. Id. at 162 ("When an indictment for crime shall be tried before a jury, and a
conviction is had, in addition to the attorney's fees allowed by this act, the district
attorney may be allowed a counsel fee in proportion to the importance and difficulty
of the cause, not exceeding thirty dollars.").
107. See United States v. Waters, 133 U.S. 208, 215-16 (1890) (holding that the dis-
trict court's reward of a counsel fee could be not be revoked or reduced by the attor-
ney general); accord Hillborn v. United States, 27 Ct. Cl. 547, 548 (1892) (following
Waters and holding that the attorney general cannot reduce the fee paid to the
prosecutor).
108. One court explained the value of the sliding scale by noting that counsel fees
corrected inequities in compensation between attorneys who appeared for the United
States and those appearing on behalf of defendants in criminal cases. The court stated
that counsel fees enabled the United States to "command the services of the most
industrious, talented, and learned members of the bar." Weed v. United States, 65 F.
399, 401 (D. Mont. 1894).
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ing to statutory schedules. 1' 9 It is important to note that the fee
schedules discussed in these cases were enacted at a time when state
and federal officials did not work for government bodies full-time.
Piecemeal compensation was the norm.
Tnes changed. In 1905, Congress abolished the fee system provid-
ing district attorneys with a conviction fee up to thirty dollars.1'0 The
new statute provided that district attorneys be paid salaries."' State
governments, too, recognized the possible dangers inherent in the fee-
based compensation system common in the early twentieth century.
The Supreme Court of Illinois in Hoyne v. Danisch,"2 noted that
"[t]he fee system, where the salary of the public official depends en-
tirely upon the amount of fees collected by him, is liable to result in
many evils and is contrary to the spirit of this section of the Constitu-
tion.""' 3 Many states, like the federal government, have now abol-
ished or repealed fee schedules for prosecutors. 4
The historical evidence provides at least anecdotal evidence that
monetary bonuses were effective motivators for prosecutors. As con-
structed early in this century, they were, perhaps, too effective.115 The
lesson to be learned from the old cases is not that rewards are bad,
however. The lesson we should take from history is that financial re-
wards can induce prosecutors to modify their behavior to conform to
the incentives created by the rewards. The point is that financial in-
109. See e.g., Parker v. Laws, 460 S.W.2d 337, 338-41 (Ark. 1970) (referring to
statutory conviction fees payable to prosecuting attorney in misdemeanor cases only);
Huddleston v. Craighead County, 194 S.W. 17, 18 (Ark. 1917) (involving prosecutor
who brought suit to recover statutory conviction fee); Edwards v. County of Fresno,
16 P. 239, 240 (Cal. 1887) (noting that prosecutor could charge and receive from the
defendant, or from the county if the defendant is unable to pay, $15 for each convic-
tion of a misdemeanor); Board of Comm'rs v. Walker, 181 P. 195, 195-96 (Colo. 1918)
(discussing district attorney's fees in the event of a felony trial or prosecution); State
ex rel. Loftin v. McMllan, 45 So. 882, 883 (Fla. 1908) (noting that the Florida prosecu-
tor was allowed to collect a conviction fee of five dollars to be paid either by the
defendant or the county in all misdemeanor cases); State ex reL Broussard v. Hender-
son, 45 So. 430, 431 (La. 1907) (quoting a state statute entitling the attorney general
and the district attorney to receive $15 on each criminal prosecution in which the
accused is convicted); State v. Hill, 43 Tenn. 98, 99 (1866) (holding that the district
attorney general was permitted a fee of $20 when there is a conviction of a defendant
where the punishment is death, else the fee is $10 for each felony conviction).
110. Appropriations Act of March 3, 1905, ch. 1483, 33 Stat. 1156, 1207.
111. Id.
112. 106 N.E. 341 (Ill. 1914).
113. Id. at 343.
114. See Dirk G. Christensen, Comment, Incentives vs. Nonpartisanship: The
Prosecutorial Dilemma in an Adversary System, 1981 Duke LJ. 311, 326 & n.115 (not-
ing that in 1981, 34 states had no prosecuting or conviction fees and that some of the
laws providing for such fees had been only recently repealed). Many of the fees were
abolished once federal, state, and local governments began to retain prosecutors on a
salary basis. However, some jurisdictions also concluded that paying prosecutors for
obtaining convictions interfered with these officials' impartiality. Id. at 328.
115. See Hoyne, 106 N.E. at 343-44; see also Wyo. Const. art. X1V, § 1 (prohibiting
prosecutors from collecting extra fees in addition to salaries).
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centives, if properly constructed, can motivate prosecutors to engage
in proper behavior.
Thus, the important question for purposes of my analysis is whether
prosecutorial behavior will be affected by financial incentives in the
nuanced manner that I predict it will. History indicates that financial
incentives motivate prosecutors to obtain more convictions when ob-
taining more convictions is the purpose of the reward. Church and
Heumann's contemporary work, 116 however, suggests that financial
incentives can motivate prosecutors to achieve other tasks related to
the process of criminal justice and indirectly tied to the prosecutor's
bottom line-winning the case. It is this evidence that I wish to draw
on as the foundation for the system of financial rewards that I de-
scribe in this Article.
One of the important findings of the Church and Heumann study is
that a primary motivator of the prosecutors who participated in the
Speedy Disposition Program was their natural competitiveness.' 17
The Speedy Disposition Program provided no individual attorney with
a financial incentive, yet there still were effects in some offices. It is
likely that even though the prosecutors received no individual reward,
the prosecutors perceived the program as providing them with an op-
portunity to "win." My hypothesis is that the prosecutorial culture
centered on winning can be redirected towards self-restraint and ethi-
cal behavior if prosecutors are motivated to "win" in their pursuit of
the reward.
Because my argument is that prosecutorial culture can be changed
in certain ways by coupling rewards and a central characteristic of
prosecutorial culture (the desire to "win"), it is not obvious that the
reward should be monetary. In fact, the crux of my argument is that
the reward scheme will be effective because of what the money repre-
sents, not because of the amounts of money involved. Nevertheless,
there are at least two reasons why the reward scheme should be im-
plemented with financial rewards rather than gold stars. First,
although the great majority of government workers do not take thejob for money, most prefer monetary incentives over almost any type
of motivator. 1 8 Second, using money as a reward allows clear distinc-
tions to be made relative to the effectiveness of the task completed.
Perceptions about the difference between alternative rewards, such as
a gold star or being the first to get new furniture or receiving extra
vacation days, may not be so clear. These ambiguities would impair
the effectiveness of the reward scheme.
That prosecutors naturally are motivated by competitiveness em-
bedded in their culture means that the rewards need not be particu-
116. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
118. See Greiner et al., supra note 2, at 18.
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larly large. They must be large enough so as not to be insignificant,
but they should not be so large that the size of the financial reward
overcomes what the rewards are supposed to represent. Initially, per-
haps the total annual reward a prosecutor could receive should be a
percentage of her salary, say five to ten percent. Department of Jus-
tice attorneys' salaries range from approximately $40,000 annually at
the entry level to approximately $90,000 at the more senior levels.
The rewards given for each conviction obtained under proper condi-
tions would then be some fraction of the total amount.11 9
Assuming the proposal is effective and motivates a prosecutor to
engage in what I have called an accurate charging practice, questions
from the second category of questions outlined above must be
addressed.
1. Trial Rates
One question that must be addressed is how a streamlined charging
practice induced by financial rewards would affect trial rates. One
might suspect that trial rates would drastically increase under the sys-
tem that I propose because the system encourages the prosecutor to
limit her bargaining discretion. If bargaining discretion is constrained,
presumably there will be less room for concessions. Consequently,
there will be fewer bargains and more trials. If we accept the fact that
plea bargains are necessary for the criminal justice system to function
effectively, then the prospect of more trials under the system that I
propose might be considered problematic.
It is, of course, exceedingly important to recognize the type of trial
that would be more numerous in the world I have described. I have
already explained that prosecutors should be motivated by the reward
system to limit their discretion in the cases in which they usually exert
the most pressure-the marginal cases. These are the cases in which
trials will become more numerous. Furthermore, because these are
also the cases in which legal guilt may be most doubtful, a trial would
be most useful to determine whether the defendant should be pun-
ished. If the increase in trials is comprised primarily of these types of
cases, it should be of little concern.
We might also expect trial rates to increase in nonmarginal cases
under a system of financial incentives that promotes "accurate" charg-
ing. If prosecutors charge defendants wvith the same offense to which
the prosecutors ultimately expect the defendants to plead guilty, why
should a defendant plead guilty if he will not face the added penalty
associated with overcharging should the defendant choose to go to
trial? Reconsider the James Roe example. If James Roe is a repeat
119. These percentages translate into total annual awards of $2000 to $9000. In the
Nothern District of Illinois, the typical Assistant U.S. Attorney indicts 6 to 10 cases
per year, so the per case reward there could range, on average, from $200 to $1500.
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player, aware of the informational advantages of the charge in the
world of rewards, why would he not choose to go to trial on the pos-
session charge? James Roe will elect to go to trial only if he is com-
pletely indifferent between pleading guilty to a charged offense and
requiring the prosecutor to prove that offense beyond a reasonable
doubt at trial. However, even under the system I propose, a defend-
ant should not be completely indifferent between pleading guilty to an
offense and electing to go to trial on the same offense. If the rewards
system completely deters a prosecutor from overcharging so that she
pursues prosecutions only on those charges that she believes she can
win, the defendant still will face the trial penalty for the particular
offense if he elects to go to trial. If the reward scheme motivates the
prosecutor to charge the defendant "accurately," the defendant will
avoid the trial penalty based on overcharged charges, but he very
probably still will face increased penalties after being convicted of an
offense after trial.12 0
The federal system has a built-in mechanism that explicitly accom-
modates sentencing concessions when the defendant elects to plead
guilty. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines specify levels that corre-
spond to certain offenses.' 2' These levels, in turn, correspond to a
range of sentences to which a defendant can be subjected once the
defendant's criminal history category is calculated. 122 A defendant
who pleads guilty and accepts responsibility is eligible for a two- or
three-level discount from the offense level specified in the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, depending on the initial level of the offense.'2 3
The discount translates roughly into a fifteen percent reduction in the
sentence that the defendant will serve.' 24
2. Undercharging
Financial rewards for "accurate" charging might lead to under-
charging. For obvious reasons undercharging conflicts with the typi-
cally cited goals of punishment (deterrence, incapacitation, or just
deserts).' 5 Under the rewards system a prosecutor will be rewarded
120. See Gifford, supra note 42, at 46-47.
121. See U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Guidelines Manual § 1B1.1, at 11 (1993) [here-
inafter USSG].
122. Id. The defendant's sentence is determined by using a grid that contains dif-
ferent ranges of sentences. The possible sentencing range for an offense is deter-
mined by locating the offense level of the offense for which the defendant is convicted
and the defendant's criminal history category, and then looking to see at what point
these two indicators intersect on the grid. See id. (displaying the Sentencing Table on
the back cover).
123. See id. § 3E1.1(a), at 248.
124. See id. (displaying the Sentencing Table on the back cover).
125. Undercharging conflicts with both specific and general deterrence. If the
charge is not severe enough, we cannot be confident that the punishment the defend-
ant receives will be adequate to deter the defendant's similar conduct in the future. If
the goal is general deterrence, we could expect that too lenient charges will not ade-
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only if the offense of conviction is very close to the offense charged,
regardless of whether that conviction is obtained by trial or plea. It is
possible that a prosecutor, in the interest of collecting many rewards,
will charge only the cases she believes are easy to prove and then un-
dercharge those cases. The defendant in such a case will plead guilty
to the exact charge because the charge will not reflect the seriousness
of the crime that the defendant committed. The defendant Will recog-
nize that he is getting a good deal. The prosecutor will take home her
bonus.
There are at least three mechanisms that could counteract under-
charging: internal controls, prosecutorial culture, and reward struc-
ture. Some prosecuting offices already have internal checks to
prevent the prosecutor from undercharging. One example is the fed-
eral internal guideline requiring Assistant U.S. Attorneys to charge
defendants with all readily provable offenses. 126 There is no reason to
think that such internal controls would be abandoned under a reward
system designed to augment them. An additional, and related, inter-
nal limitation on undercharging could flow from a combination of su-
pervisory review of trial attorneys and the structure of the financial
rewards system as I have described it. The reward that I have de-
scribed would be available only to the trial attorneys in particular
cases on a case-by-case basis and not to supervisors who do not actu-
ally participate in a case. The nonparticipating supervisors will have
an interest in ensuring that the trial attorneys are effective law en-
forcement officials, primarily because their future as supervisors is de-
pendent upon the success of the attorneys they supervise. This
interest should not be affected whether the supervisor is evaluated by
a bureaucratic hierarchy, as in the federal system, or at the polls, as is
usually the case of chief prosecutors in state systems. One way that
effectiveness can be measured is by a combination of the prosecutor's
conviction rate and the severity of sentences on those convictions.
Gross undercharging, then, would undermine the supervisor's percep-
tion of the line attorney's effectiveness because even if that prosecutor
had a very high conviction rate, her overall sentence severity evalua-
tion would be quite low. Because the supervisors control promotion
of trial attorneys, and since promotion is dependent upon effective-
quately deter others from engaging in criminal conduct. There is a similar story with
respect to incapacitation. If the defendant is undercharged, he will not be punished as
severely and will return to the community sooner. The just deserts theory of punish-
ment presents probably the most apparent conflict with undercharging. If the prose-
cutor charges the defendant with a lesser crime than the defendant's conduct
obviously supports, the defendant clearly will not receive the punishment the commu-
nity, through the legislature, has decided that he deserves.
126. See Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 57, at 506-12 (discussing Justice Depart-
ment initiatives to prevent charge bargaining by instituting a Department policy re-
quiring that Assistant U.S. Attorneys charge all "readily provable" charges).
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ness, undercharging can be controlled in part through supervisor
review.
In addition to internal controls, there are characteristics of the
prosecutorial culture that should help to counteract any potential in-
centive to undercharge created by the financial incentive system I pro-
pose here. First, the prosecutorial ethos that leads to "highest and
most" charging in the first place is generated, at least in part, from
self-selection. This ethos suggests that a reward for constraining
charging discretion would operate as a kind of one-way ratchet. Sec-
ond, many prosecutors desire to convert their success as prosecutors
into lucrative jobs as private attorneys. Prosecutors make themselves
attractive to solicitous firms in part by relying on their extensive trial
practice, which distinguishes them from the bulk of private attorneys.
Again, gross undercharging would undercut a prosecutor's ability to
trade her experience as a trial attorney for a lucrative job in the pri-
vate sector if undercharging leads to a very high percentage of pleas
and a low percentage of trials.
Undercharging could also be addressed in the details of the reward
scheme. As an initial and relatively simple matter, the financial incen-
tive system should place a premium on trials over pleas.'2 7 That is, the
system should be constructed so that the financial reward for ob-
taining a conviction for trial is greater than the reward received for
obtaining a conviction by plea.128 A more complex reward system
could be further differentiated based on the seriousness of the crime
and the difficulty of the case. One method for differentiation is a scor-
ing system for determining how much reward an individual prosecutor
could receive for a prosecution. For example, the scoring system
could be comprised of a seriousness scale and a difficulty scale, and
the reward could be determined by a product of the two. The serious-
ness scale could simply reflect the seriousness of the crime. To evalu-
ate seriousness, an office could look to the Federal Sentencing
127. One obvious reason for placing a premium on trials over pleas is that trials
usually take longer than pleas do. A comparison of the median amounts of time from
filing to disposition in all of the federal circuits for the year ending June 30, 1991,
reveals that the ratio of jury trial disposition time to guilty plea disposition time
ranges from 1.3 to 1.9, with 1.6 as the median for the 12 relevant courts of appeals.
Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, supra note 43, tbl. 5.29.
128. The line between a trial and a plea may not always be crystal clear. A confes-
sional stipulation may be for all intents and purposes a de facto guilty plea. See
Maurita E. Horn, Confessional Stipulations: Protecting Waiver of Constitutional
Rights, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 225,226 (1994). For purposes of my analysis, a confessional
stipulation probably should be treated as a plea. A so-called "slow plea" (a bench
trial conducted after a defendant has waived his right to a jury trial) might either be
the functional equivalent of a guilty plea, or it might be better characterized as a
deliberate, though swift, trial of the evidence. See Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing
the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System,
50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 931, 1033-36 (1983).
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Guidelines, where offense level represents the seriousness of the
crime. 29
A scale for difficulty might be more burdensome to develop. Many
factors determine what makes a case easy or difficult to try. Some
factors are relevant to the evidence of the case, some are relevant to
procedural hurdles, and some are relevant to public perception. Pros-
ecuting offices regularly evaluate cases during the intake process for
the purpose of routing them to various attorneys. More senior attor-
neys usually receive more difficult cases, while rookies get the easier
ones. This routing practice indicates that internal office policies al-
ready contain mechanisms for differentiating between difficult cases
and easy cases. It would be a simple matter to assign a number system
to this evaluation and use such numbers in the scoring system.
Utilizing a scoring system that accommodates seriousness of of-
fenses and case difficulty would allow supervisors to better align their
interests with those of the line prosecutors who try cases. If offense
level is taken seriously as an indication of the seriousness of the case,
cases involving high-publicity offenders on relatively nonserious
charges would receive a lower score and, correspondingly, a lower bo-
nus than a case involving an undistinguished defendant in a fre-
quently-occurring drug sale case. A scale that reflected offense
seriousness would place a premium on prosecution and deterrence of
criminal offenses rather than publicity. 30
3. Other Forms of Bargaining Adaptation
Even if undercharging were eradicated or reduced by the reward
scheme, other forms of prosecutorial inducements to obtain pleas
could arise. In a system without the constraints of determinate sen-
tencing, sentence bargaining could replace charge bargaining. In a de-
terminate sentencing scheme, such as the guideline-based federal
system, there are few opportunities to manipulate sentences without
manipulating charges. The majority of sentencing schemes in the
United States are not guideline-based, though more states are adopt-
ing determinate sentencing schemes.' 3'
129. For example, the offense of Obstruction of Justice, prohibited by 18 U.S.C.
§ 401, has a Base Offense Level of 12, USSG, supra note 121, § 231.2, at 148, while
Criminal Sexual Abuse, prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 2241, has a Base Offense Level of
27. USSG, supra note 121, § 2A3.1, at 42. If the Sentencing Guidelines were adopted
as a guide to determine the seriousness of the case for purposes of a financial incen-
tive system, there would be a higher score for Criminal Sexual Abuse than for Ob-
struction of Justice.
130. For an explanation of the ways in which the interests and incentives of a chief
prosecutor in a typical public prosecutor's office may diverge from the interests and
incentives of the line assistants, see Schulhofer, supra note 61, at 50-51.
131. Professor Richard Frase reported that, as of the fall of 1993, 15 states and the
federal government had either adopted or were in the process of adopting sentencing
guidelines. Richard S. Frase, The Uncertain Future of Sentencing Guidelines, 12 Law
& Ineq. J. 1, 1 (1993).
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A restriction on charge bargaining still would be desirable even if
some sentence bargaining remains. Manipulating charges allows the
prosecutor two methods of sentence manipulation. She can control
the maximum sentence exposure prescribed by the particular offense.
She also can control the charges, which can be translated into very
heavy punishment if the sentences for the various charges are imposed
consecutively rather than concurrently. Limiting charge bargaining
necessarily limits the prosecutor's power because the only tool left to
manipulate is a tool over which she must share her power with judges.
Even though the financial incentive model I have described should
interact well with a system of determinate sentencing to limit charge
bargaining, prosecutors in these systems might attempt to move the
bargaining process to earlier stages in the process. For example, pros-
ecutors might be motivated to cut deals prior to the indictment stage.
One could make the argument that, at least in today's world, manipu-
lative bargaining practices are out in the open, which is better than a
world in which such practices are pushed underground.
If the present federal practice can be used as an example, it may be
unlikely that preindictment bargaining will occur. Little preindict-
ment bargaining now occurs because of institutional pressure from
superiors. There is a logical basis for this pressure. As Professor
Schulhofer has pointed out, the prosecutor must be sure that the de-
fendant will abide by the bargain once the case is filed if the bargain is
struck prior to indictment. 132 Once the case is filed, the prosecutor
cannot easily remedy the situation by filing more serious and numer-
ous charges previously withheld if the defendant reneges on a pre-
indictment bargain. That a federal indictment may not be amended is
a well-settled rule. 33 A federal court may permit a federal informa-
tion to be amended at any time before a verdict or finding, provided
that no additional or different offense is charged and the rights of the
defendant are not substantially prejudiced.134
4. The Problem of Race and Gender in Charging Decisions
The proposed system's potential to exacerbate race and gender ef-
fects cannot be overlooked in assessing the potential objections to us-
ing financial incentives to reward prosecutors for making accurate
charging decisions. In addition to the strength of the admissible evi-
dence against the defendant, prosecutors might illegitimately consider
factors such as the race of the defendant, the victim, and the potential
jurors to determine whether the case is an easy or difficult one to win.
Evidence collected in scholarly articles indicates that the race of the
132. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Due Process of Sentencing, 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 733, 788
(1980).
133. Charles A. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal 2d § 127 (2d ed.
1982 & Supp. 1995).
134. Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(e).
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defendant and the victim sometimes affects the prosecutor's decision
to file charges at all, her selection of the severity of charges to file, and
which charges to file.135 Empirical studies have shown that prosecu-
tors do not always treat cases with black victims and white victims in
the same manner.136 Similarly, a prosecutor may tend not to prose-
cute certain cases because juries often are biased against convicting
defendants of certain offenses. Domestic violence and date rape pros-
ecutions may be examples. 137 By offering rewards for convictions,
prosecutors, already reluctant to prosecute certain cases, may become
even more reluctant.
Injecting financial incentives into prosecutorial charging decisions
might in some way exacerbate race and gender bias that currently ex-
ists. For example, prosecutors may place even more emphasis on race
and gender factors in considering which cases to bring or what charges
to assert. Though a financial incentive system arguably might in some
way make these problems worse, it is hard to imagine that financial
incentives would make any race and gender bias problems currently in
the system much worse than they are now.
It is also possible that in a world with rewards, prosecutors will pay
more attention to cases they previously scorned, such as domestic vio-
lence cases or date rape cases, if the rewards are structured with an
emphasis on seriousness of offense while deemphasizing publicity.13
Moreover, the benefits that the system creates in alleviating the une-
qual bargaining positions of the defendant and the prosecutor cannot
be overlooked. Put another way, a more level playing field in the plea
context would benefit all defendants. Although it seems that a system
of financial incentives may have the effect of both aggravating and
alleviating race effects, there is a sense in which the benefits of re-
wards might outweigh the drawbacks. 39
135. Randolph N. Stone, The Criminal Justice System" Unfair and Ineffective, 2
Harv. J. Afr. Am. Pub. Pol'y 53, 63-64 (1993) (citing several sources).
136. Id. at 64.
137. See Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violenc4 1970-
1990, 83 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 46,71 (1992) (noting that a very small percentage
of people arrested for domestic violence in a Milwaukee domestic violence experi-
ment were eventually prosecuted); see also Susan Estrich, Real Rape 8-26 (1987) (ex-
plaining that prosecutors may decline to prosecute rape cases if the circumstances of
the case do not fit the "stranger" rape scenario).
138. See supra note 87.
139. The primary remedy to the problems of race and gender effects lies in con-
sciousness raising and education of law enforcement officials. The ABA Task Force
on Minorities and the Justice System suggests the following: (1) increase the number
of minority judges, prosecutors, and defenders; (2) promote cross-cultural awareness
by funding pilot programs designed to reduce the high incarceration rate of African-
American males; (3) monitor prosecutorial charging and plea bargaining discretion;
(4) provide adequate funding and resources for indigent defense services; (5) reexam-
ine bail, sentencing, and jury selection policies; and (6) review criminal legislation for
disparate impact on minorities. See ABA Task Force on Minorities and the Justice
System, Achieving Justice in a Diverse America 13-27 (1992).
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I. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Prosecutorial misconduct is readily apparent to any lawyer who
keeps abreast of appellate review of criminal convictions. 140 Case af-
ter case demonstrates the persistent reoccurrence of misconduct, such
as forensic misconduct and prosecutorial disclosure violations. 14' Fig-
uring prominently in the persistence of prosecutorial misconduct is the
lack of effective sanctions for prosecutorial misconduct. This part fo-
cuses primarily on the misconduct of prosecutors occurring at trial,
such as improper comments in opening statements and closing argu-
ments and misconduct relating to the prosecutor's duty to disclose evi-
dence to the defense. I argue that financial incentives could be used
to motivate prosecutors to attain the high standards of conduct em-
bodied in the rules of professional responsibility, offsetting the lack of
vigorous enforcement of ethical rules.
The discussion of financial incentives in part II proceeds in four sec-
tions. Section A reviews currently available sanctions and evaluates
the effectiveness of these sanctions in deterring prosecutorial miscon-
duct. Section A concludes with a model of financial incentives to mo-
tivate prosecutors to comport their behavior with the rules of
professional responsibility. Section B illustrates the predicted effects
of the model by applying it to two recurring types of prosecutorial
misconduct: improper argument and failure to disclose evidence to
the defendant under Brady v. Maryland.42 Section C specifies the
role the appellate courts must play for the model to be efficacious.
Finally, section D evaluates possible objections to the financial incen-
tive model.
140. It is very difficult to assess accurately the frequency of prosecutorial miscon-
duct. Walter W. Steele, Jr., Unethical Prosecutors and Inadequate Discipline, 38 Sw.
L.J. 965, 970 (1984) (noting that no practical method has been developed to measure
the frequency of misconduct, except to rely on impressions gained from the volume of
appellate opinions and the language contained in them). Relying on reported cases
alone, it would seem that the incidence of prosecutorial misconduct is staggering. Of
course, once one compares the numbers of reported cases to the cases that are actu-
ally litigated and then to the number of criminal cases overall, where the vast majority
are disposed of without trial, the percentage of cases involving misconduct looks
rather small. The anecdotal evidence indicates that prosecutorial misconduct occurs
at a rate higher than is indicated in reported cases-both those cases that go to trial
and those that do not. Id. at 975. Even if we assume that the vast majority of prosecu-
tors abide by the ethical rules, it still would be beneficial to provide all prosecutors
with incentives to pay attention to them. It has been recognized time and again that
government lawyers, because they wield the power of the state, must be held to a
higher standard than other lawyers. Prosecutors rightly must comply with an entirely
different set of standards than those applicable to the defense bar.
141. See generally Albert W. Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and
Trial Judges, 50 Tex. L. Rev. 629, 630-33 (1972) (discussing the prevalence of
prosecutorial misconduct); Rosen, supra note 92, at 697-703 (collecting cases discuss-
ing prosecutorial disclosure violations).
142. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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A. Existing Checks on Prosecutorial Misconduct and a New Model
Civil damages are useful to deter unlawful conduct or unreasonable
behavior. In Imbler v. Pachtman, however, the Supreme Court held
that prosecutors are not subject to civil actions for damages arising
from their wrongful conduct as advocates. 43 Thus, a prosecutor is ab-
solutely immune from civil suits arising from her conduct at trial even
when a court holds that, for example, the prosecutor's comment in
closing argument deprived a defendant of his right to a fair trial under
the Sixth Amendment. Delivery of a closing argument is one of the
duties of a prosecutor as an advocate; therefore, Imbler requires that
the prosecutor be protected by the shield of immunity. The defend-
ant's remedy in such a case is a new trial. Additionally, Imbler dic-
tates that even when a prosecutor's conduct clearly violates the rule
set out in Brady v. Maryland, which protects the defendant's right to
due process of law, the prosecutor is absolutely immune from civil
damages. The Imbler Court reasoned that the necessity of ensuring
that the prosecutor could effectively execute her official duties out-
weighed the importance of providing the defendant with a civil dam-
ages remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.144
The Court provided several justifications for its decision in Imbler.
The Court was concerned that criminal defendants would initiate civil
143. The Court noted the long-standing common law tradition of affording prosecu-
tors immunity from civil suits arising from acts taken within the scope of their duties.
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422-24 (1976). The prosecutor's historical common
law immunity from civil suits was one of the bases for the Court's decision to extend
to prosecutors absolute immunity from actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Imbler, 424
U.S. at 424. The Imbler Court held that the prosecutor's knowing suppression of evi-
dence that exculpated the defendant and the prosecutor's knowing use of perjured
testimony were entitled to absolute immunity from an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427. In Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 113 S. Ct. 2606 (1993), the
Supreme Court reiterated the rule set out in Imbler that prosecutors are entitled to
absolute immunity from actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for conduct that is "intimately
associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process," Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2613-
14 (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430), but the Court declined to extend to prosecutors
absolute immunity for conduct that is not closely associated with the judicial process.
Rather, the Court stated that prosecutors are entitled only to qualified immunity
when they act as administrators or investigators. Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2614-16. Thus,
prosecutors are not entitled to absolute immunity for giving legal advice to police
officers. See Burns v. Reed, 111 S. Ct. 1934, 1942-43 (1991). Nor are prosecutors
entitled to absolute immunity when they function in the same manner as detectives
under circumstances in which a detective would be entitled only to qualified immu-
nity. Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2616-17.
144. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427. There is a strong counterargument. In a concur-
ring opinion, Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, argued that ab-
solute immunity should not be granted to prosecutors who knowingly suppress
favorable evidence in violation of Brady: "Denial of immunity for unconstitutional
withholding of evidence would encourage such disclosure. A prosecutor seeking to
protect himself from liability for failure to disclose evidence may be induced to dis-
close more than is required. But, this will hardly injure the judicial process. Indeed, it
will help it." Id at 443 (White, J., concurring).
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rights suits merely for revenge.' 45 Defending these suits would be un-
reasonably and unnecessarily time consuming for the prosecutor. 146
The Court believed that civil rights suits would be virtual retrials of
the defendant's criminal liability, and the Court concluded that habeas
proceedings and appeals were more appropriate remedies because
these proceedings focused on the fairness of the trial rather than the
prosecutor's misconduct. 47 The Imbler Court emphasized that sub-
jecting prosecutors to civil suits was not the only means of deterrence
the public had at its disposal. The Court looked to the criminal law
(the existence of criminal sanctions under 18 U.S.C. § 242)148 and to
ethical standards promulgated by professional associations of lawyers
to provide the deterrence to prosecutorial misconduct that civil liabil-
ity could have provided.'4 9
It is not clear that civil damages would curb effectively the persis-
tence of prosecutorial misconduct, even if such damage actions were
available. The poor are disproportionately represented among crimi-
nal defendants, and generally speaking, there is no right to appointed
145. 1l at 425.
146. See id.
147. See id. at 425-27.
148. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1994) reads:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom,
willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory, or District to the depri-
vation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains,
or penalties, on account of such person being an alien, or by reason of his
color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if
bodily injury results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if
such acts include the use, attempted use, or threatened use of a dangerous
weapon, explosives, or fire, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than ten years, or both; and if death results from the acts committed in
violation of this section or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to
kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual
abuse, or an attempt to kill, shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for
any term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death.
An exhaustive search for cases in which prosecutors were prosecuted under this sec-
tion revealed not a single example.
There are several explanations for the fact that an on-line search revealed no prose-
cutions of prosecutors under 18 U.S.C. § 242. It could indicate that prosecutorial mis-
conduct is never severe enough to warrant criminal prosecution. Or it could indicate
that federal prosecutors, in their broad discretion, do not prosecute such cases, even
when there is evidence that a criminal violation exists. But it could also indicate that
prosecutors who are convicted under § 242 always plead guilty to the offense and
never challenge their sentences on appeal. This last scenario is highly unlikely, how-
ever. It is much more likely that the low number of cases tends to support the hy-
pothesis that the existence of the sanction is not a meaningful deterrent to
prosecutorial misconduct and prosecutorial violation of criminal defendants' constitu-
tional rights-a conclusion that is contrary to the Court's assertion in Imbler.
149. The Court stated: "Moreover, a prosecutor stands perhaps unique, among of-
ficials whose acts could deprive persons of constitutional rights, in his amenability to
professional discipline by an association of his peers." Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409, 429 (1976).
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counsel in civil cases. 5 ' Unless these civil damage suits reap lucrative
damage awards, it is unlikely that many attorneys would accept them
on a contingency fee basis. Because many of those who are affected
by prosecutorial misconduct do not have the means to hire attorneys
to represent them in civil suits, the availability of a damage action to
remedy a constitutional violation might not mean very much. More-
over, the ineffectiveness of civil rights damage suits against other gov-
ernment officials illuminates the predicted effectiveness of these same
suits for prosecutors. Police officers have only qualified immunity 5 '
and thus are subject to civil damage actions for individual rights viola-
tions in many more cases than are prosecutors. Nonetheless, empiri-
cal research seriously questions whether civil damage actions are an
effective deterrent against police misconduct.15 Still, the existence of
damages actions may be useful as a symbol of the public's intolerance
of the violation of individual rights by government officials, even if
civil damage awards have very limited practical impact.
The threat of contempt sanctions, in theory, should provide some
deterrence against prosecutorial misconduct, as courts are empowered
to hold in contempt prosecutors who engage in prosecutorial miscon-
duct before them.'53 Few courts, however, exercise this power.' As-
150. Branch v. Cole, 686 F.2d 264,266 (5th Cir. 1982); Caruth v. Pinkney, 683 F.2d
1044, 1048 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1214 (1983).
151. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 113 S. Ct. 2606,2615-16 (1993) (explaining that quali-
fied immunity is the norm for public officials).
152. See e.g., Jonathan D. Casper et al., The Tort Remedy in Search and Seizure
Cases: A Case Study in Juror Decision Making, 13 Law & Soc. Inquiry 279 (1988)
(reviewing empirical literature on the incidence and outcomes of civil suits against
police officers for police misconduct and finding that defendant officers often prevail
and that awards obtained by prevailing plaintiffs do not seem large enough to provide
a deterrent effect). Prosecutors are protected only by qualified immunity when they
act as investigators rather than as prosecutors. Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2614-16. How-
ever, this limited window of opportunity for plaintiffs affects only a very small minor-
ity of instances of prosecutorial misconduct since prosecutors spend most of their time
acting as prosecutors!
153. See 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1994). Section 401 states:
A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprison-
ment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as-
(1) ~isbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to ob-
struct the administration of justice;
(2) Isbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions;
(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ process, order, rule, decree,
or command.
154. See Bennett L. Gershman, Prosecutorial Misconduct § 13.3, at 13-13 n.69
(1989) (collecting a very small number of state cases in which prosecutors were held
in contempt by the court for misconduct). Perhaps trial courts reluctantly exercise
their contempt power over prosecutors because these courts fear reversal on appeal.
See, for example, Weiss v. Burr, 484 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1973), where the prosecuting
attorney was cited for five counts of contempt by the trial court, but the appellate
court set aside all five counts on the basis that one citation was based on noncontemp-
tuous behavior, one citation was insufficiently specific, and the final three were defec-
tive because the prosecutor was not permitted to speak in mitigation before
sentencing. IL at 980-81, 984, 987.
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suming courts are concerned about effectively controlling
prosecutorial misconduct, their reluctance to use contempt as a mech-
anism to combat prosecutorial misconduct is somewhat curious. A
court can use the contempt power to sanction the prosecutor specifi-
cally, and the court can tailor the sanction to fit the conduct.
One explanation for courts' reluctance to employ contempt to con-
trol prosecutorial misconduct is that courts are reluctant to resort to
contempt generally. Courts traditionally have viewed contempt as an
extraordinary sanction for attorney misconduct rather than an ordi-
nary one, employing the sanction only as a last resort. 5 5 This tradi-
tion is supported by more than court rhetoric. Federal courts have
developed rules for the exercise of contempt that require the court to
find that an attorney "deliberate[ly intended] to pursue a course of
improper argument or prohibited conduct."' Other cases seem to
indicate that a lesser standard will suffice to punish contumacious con-
duct. 157 A more strict mens rea standard requires a court considering
a contempt citation to make more exacting findings. Thus, it is prob-
able that the likelihood of a court imposing contempt against a prose-
cutor is negatively correlated to the strictness of the mens rea
requirement for contempt in a given jurisdiction.
Though the courts are reluctant to use it, contempt is a more attrac-
tive sanction for prosecutorial misconduct than reversal 5 8 for at least
two reasons. First, contempt is directed specifically at the misconduct
of the prosecutor, where reversal operates to give the defendant the
primary benefit-the prosecutor's "sanction" is simply a by-product
of the new trial. Second, reversal of a conviction imposes the costs of
a new trial on the public at large, but contempt arguably does not
consume the same large amounts of judicial and public resources.
While probably not as costly as a new trial, exercise of the contempt
power is not cheap. In most instances in which contempt would be
appropriate, the contempt would be characterized as criminal rather
than civil.' 59 A criminal contempt proceeding is much like any other
155. See, e.g., Colon v. U.S. Att'y, 576 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1978) (affirming the district
court's refusal to hold hearings on Colon's allegations that the government engaged in
misconduct in prosecuting him; the court of appeals enumerated its arsenal of discipli-
nary weapons, noting that citation for contempt was at the "severe end of the
spectrum").
156. United States v. Sopher, 347 F.2d 415, 418 (7th Cir. 1965); see also United
States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 367-68 (7th Cir. 1972) (requiring a showing of specific
intent in all contempt cases).
157. In these cases, the disregard of authority must be willful; willfulness may be
inferred if a lawyer's conduct discloses a "'reckless disregard for his professional
duty.'" In re Farquhar, 492 F.2d 561, 564 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (quoting Sykes v. United
States, 444 F.2d 928, 930 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
158. See infra notes 186-90 and accompanying text (explaining reversal as a quasi-
sanction for prosecutorial misconduct).
159. See United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. 2552, 2556-59 (1994), for the
Supreme Court's most recent exposition of the differences between civil and criminal
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criminal proceeding in that the contemnor must be given the protec-
tions of the code of criminal procedure. 160 The costs involved with
providing a prosecutor charged with criminal contempt procedural
protections similar to the elaborate procedural protection that we
would provide in any other criminal case could be a reason for the
courts' reluctance to utilize it as a sanction for misconduct. Not every
criminal contempt sanction imposed by a court would have to be ac-
companied by the full panoply of procedural protections, however.
For example, a federal court may punish summarily a prosecutor
whose conduct constitutes contempt when the judge certifies that the
contumacious conduct was committed in the judge's presence.' 61 Any
other criminal contempt, however, may be prosecuted only on notice
and with a hearing. 162 Such a hearing probably would not be as costly
as a new trial for the defendant based on prosecutorial misconduct,
but it would still impose costs on the public by tapping limited judicial
resources.
163
contempt. Whether the contempt is criminal or civil has less to do with the content-
nor's conduct and more to do with the type of sanction the court wishes to impose.
Determinate sanctions, such as a fixed sum or imprisonment for a fixed period, are
usually considered criminal sanctions imposed to preserve the dignity of the court
because criminal contempt punishes past conduct. Civil contempt is designed to co-
erce future conduct. The test is easier to state than it is to utilize in practice.
160. As in any other criminal case, the contemnor (the defendant) is presumed in-
nocent until he is proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and a criminal contempt
case in federal court must be prosecuted by a public prosecutor or an appointed mem-
ber of the bar as a special prosecutor if the U.S. Attorney declines to prosecute. See
Young v. United States ex reL Vuitton et Fils, 481 U.S. 787, 801-02 (1987) (invoking
the supervisory powers of the Court to reject the practice of appointing the plaintiff's
attorney as special prosecutor because the plaintiff's lawyer's duty to her client will
sometime conflict with the proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion). Moreover, a
defendant who is prosecuted for criminal contempt cannot be compelled to testify
against himself. And if the sanction is considered serious enough, a defendant prose-
cuted for criminal contempt may be entitled to a jury trial. See Dan B. Dobbs, Law of
Remedies § 2.8(4), at 146-47 (2d ed. 1993). Finally, sanctions meted out in criminal
contempt must be limited to criminal sentences provided by statute, in contrast to
civil contempt sanctions, which theoretically could last indefinitely. Id. at 147.
161. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 42(a). These "direct contempts" require no separate trial
or presentation of evidence. See Dobbs, supra note 160, § 2.8(1) n.5. The judiciary has
the power to impose summary punishment without notice or hearing to quell disrup-
tion or to maintain the integrity and authority of the court. See Cooke v. United
States, 267 U.S. 517, 537 (1925) (stating that except for those contempts committed in
the presence of the court, due process requires that the accused be advised of the
charges and have a reasonable opportunity to meet them by way of defense or
explanation).
162. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 42(b).
163. See Joseph F. Lawless, Jr., Prosecutorial Misconduct § 13.21 cmt. (1985)
("From a pragmatic perspective, counsel must consider the plight of the trial judge
having to deal with a rambunctious prosecutor in the midst of a heated murder trial.
The moment the assistant prosecutor is held in contempt, his boss will be in the appel-
late court asking for and probably obtaining a stay order and meeting the press to
castigate the judge for interfering with a dedicated prosecutor trying to 'put away two
ruthless killers.' "). Mr. Lawless's comment is especially applicable to the plight of
judges and prosecutors who are elected. It may be extremely difficult for those in
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Based on the foregoing, judges understandably may be reluctant to
reverse convictions and impose on the public the costs of a new trial
for the defendant based on the prosecutor's misconduct, unless they
are absolutely sure that the misconduct has reached the point at whichjudicial tolerance would simply be unacceptable. Certainly, miscon-
duct is unacceptable when it reaches constitutional dimensions. How-
ever, misconduct often fails to reach constitutional levels because the
evidence of the defendant's guilt is very strong.
A court might rely on sanctions other than contempt, such as fines
without resort to the contempt power, to control prosecutorial mis-
conduct. The Supreme Court of Nevada, for example, has fined pros-
ecutors for misconduct. 164 The Nevada court's strategy is an attractive
alternative to contempt.165 It is cheaper because the costs of hearings
elected office to explain to the average voter that limited judicial resources should be
spent on keeping prosecutors in line when many citizens believe that criminal defend-
ants are afforded too much protection. A survey of first-year college students indi-
cates that approximately 69% of men and 65% of women "agree[d] strongly" or
"agree[d] somewhat" that there is "too much concern in the courts for the rights of
criminals." See Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, supra note 43, tbl. 2.83.
164. See McGuire v. State, 677 P.2d 1060, 1065 (Nev. 1984) (fining prosecutor per-
sonally $500 for misconduct and requiring the prosecutor to remit the fine to the
Washoe County Law Library Book Fund). In a subsequent decision, the Nevada
Supreme Court reiterated its power to impose fines for prosecutorial misconduct. See
Williams v. State, 734 P.2d 700, 704 n.6 (Nev. 1987). The Williams court cited Mc-
Guire for the proposition that the court is empowered to impose monetary sanctions
on attorneys for misconduct, and the court also warned attorneys that in the future
the court would be less hesitant to sanction attorneys by identifying them in opinions.
Id. Thus, after McGuire, it seems as if Nevada courts might rely on monetary sanc-
tions as a measure intermediate to reversal and affirmation through harmless error in
the face of misconduct. However, after reading the Nevada cases discussing the
power and willingness of the courts there to sanction prosecutors for misconduct, I am
not convinced that Nevada courts will be willing to impose monetary fines as an inter-
mediate sanction for prosecutorial misconduct, even when a conviction is upheld.
First, there have been no cases discussing the power to fine since Williams. Second, in
Moser v. State, 544 P.2d 424 (Nev. 1975), on which McGuire and Williams rely, Chief
Justice Gunderson stated:[I]n cases tried after this date, where the trial transcript discloses improper
argument, I understand that this court will consider referring the offending
attorney to the local administrative committee for determination of an ap-
propriate penalty. Where a retrial is necessitated, I suggest the penalty might
properly include payment of court costs to the state, and an appropriate as-
sessment to cover the cost of public or private defense counsel.
Id. at 428 (emphasis added). Third, after Moser, the Nevada Supreme Court decided
Talancon v. State, 621 P.2d 1111 (Nev. 1981). There, the court highlighted the im-
proper comments made by the prosecutor but upheld the defendant's conviction in
light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt. Id. at 1112. The court then reiteiated its
willingness to impose monetary sanctions against prosecutors where their misconduct
requires reversal for a new trial. Id. I could locate no case in which a Nevada court
imposed sanctions for prosecutorial misconduct in absence of a conviction reversal,
which probably means that Nevada's sanction will be no more efficacious as a deter-
rent to misconduct than reversal itself.
165. Of course, under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(a), it would be possi-
ble for a federal court to summarily impose a fine for criminal contempt based on the
misconduct of a prosecutor that occurred in the court's presence. In the McGuire
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are saved. Additionally, it is intuitively obvious that a fine should
more effectively deter misconduct than a verbal reprimand. Unfortu-
nately, it appears that no jurisdiction other than Nevada imposes fines
for prosecutorial misconduct without resort to the contempt power.166
Appellate court comments on, and reprimands for, prosecutorial
misconduct in published opinions are probably the most widely used
sanction mechanism.1 67 If the prosecutor's conduct is particularly
egregious, the court might mention the prosecutor's name.168 The
theory behind these published citations is public embarrassment. 169
Public reprimands are cheap. They do not take much time to mete
out, nor do they take up inordinately large amounts of judicial re-
sources or burden the public. Public reprimands would be a wonder-
ful remedy for prosecutorial misconduct for these reasons if they were
effective. The very courts that employ them as a sanction, however,
have lamented the method's ineffectiveness. 170
case the court imposed the fine at the appellate level, whereas the misconduct oc-
curred before the trial court. 677 P.2d at 1062-63, 1065.
166. Research for this Article revealed little reluctance on the part of the courts to
rely on their inherent powers to financially sanction attorneys in civil cases. See, e.g.,
Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557,566 (3d Cir. 1985) (noting that the sanc-
tions available under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are inadequate to regulate
a wide range of attorney misconduct). Moreover, numerous commentators have ex-
plored the subject of sanctions imposed directly upon attorneys as opposed to their
clients. See, e.g., Michael S. Cooper, Comment, Financial Penalties Imposed Directly
Against Attorneys in Litigation Without Resort to the Contempt Power, 26 UCLA L
Rev. 855 (1979) (analyzing conceptual and practical problems which have attended
the employment of traditional sanctions in litigation); David W. Pollak, Comment,
Sanctions Imposed by Courts on Attorneys Who Abuse the Judicial Process, 44 U. ChL.
L. Rev. 619 (1977) (discussing the variety of sanctions available to courts against at-
torneys who have abused the judicial process). In contrast to these numerous opin-
ions, the dearth of similar sanctions imposed on prosecutors in the criminal context is
stunning.
167. See, e.g., United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315, 1318-23 (9th Cir. 1993) (up-
braiding both the Assistant U.S. Attorneys and their supervisors); United States v.
Pallais, 921 F.2d 684, 691-92 (7th Cir. 1990) (acknowledging both repeated use of
rebukes for improper argument and the ineffectiveness of such rebukes), cert. denied,
502 U.S. 842 (1991); United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1182 (2d Cir. 1981) (cit-
ing several cases in which courts resorted to comments on prosecutorial misconduct in
an attempt to deter future misdconduct), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 989 (1982).
168. See Modica, 663 F.2d at 1185 (noting the additional sanction of naming the
prosecutor as an alternative to reversal). Ironically, even the Modica court declined
to reveal the prosecutor's name. IL at 1185 n.7.
169. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 734 P.2d 700,704 n.6 (Nev. 1987) (recognizing that
identifying "perpetrators" of misconduct can do "lasting professional injury" by "di-
minishing their prospects when they may later be considered for judgeships or other
public offices").
170. See Pallais, 921 F.2d at 691-92 ("We rebuke prosecutors repeatedly for com-
menting on a defendant's failure to take the stand .... Ten years ago we were com-
menting on a 'sense of futility from persistent disregard of prior admonitions.' These
rebukes seem to have little effect, no doubt because of the harmless error rule, which
in this as in many other cases precludes an effective remedy for prosecutorial miscon-
duct." (quoting United States v. Rodriquez, 627 F.2d 110, 112 (7th Cir. 1980) (citation
omitted)).
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Given the dearth of effective sanction machinery, one might think
that the prosecutor's colleagues in the bar might be counted on to
check prosecutorial excesses by subjecting prosecutors to scrutiny. In
fact, the Imbler Court explicitly relied on the existence of sanctions by
professional associations as a reason to grant to prosecutors absolute
immunity from civil damages resulting from constitutional viola-
tions . 71 After the review of various other existing sanctions in the
preceding paragraphs, it should not be surprising that prosecutors
rarely are sanctioned by their colleagues in the professional regulation
entities.
Prosecutors, as all lawyers, are subject to some version of profes-
sional regulation in every state. 72 Violations of these ethical rules
could expose a prosecutor to discipline from the legal profession
through state bar associations or disciplinary committees for miscon-
duct. These professional disciplinary bodies have the power to sanc-
tion prosecutors and impose sanctions as serious as disbarment.
171. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976) ("[A] prosecutor stands perhaps
unique, among officials whose acts could deprive persons of constitutional rights, in
his amenability to professional discipline by an association of his peers.").
172. Rosen, supra note 92, at 712 n.103. Federal as well as state prosecutors look to
rules of professional responsibility that govern lawyers practicing in the various states.
Accordingly, a Justice Department attorney can be subject to discipline under the
Department's own internal rules for violating a bar ethics rule in appropriate cases. 28
C.F.R. § 45.735-1(b) to (c) (1995). What is less clear is the amenability of federal
prosecutors to regulation by the various state disciplinary bodies.
Recently, there has been a dispute as to how far state bars may go in sanctioning
federal prosecutors for violations of state ethics rules. Lyn M. Morton, Note, Seeking
the Elusive Remedy for Prosecutorial Misconduct: Suppression, Dismissal, or Disci-
pline?, 7 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1083, 1092-98 (1994). One very public dispute involves
the Federal covernment's policy regarding contacts with unrepresented persons dic-
tated by former Attorney General Richard Thornburgh's position that Model Code
Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A)(1) and Model Rule 4.2 (both pertaining to contacts with
represented parties) did not apply to federal prosecutors, see id. at 1093, because the
Supremacy Clause prevents states from enforcing ethical rules that are inconsistent
with a federal prosecutor's duties. Research for this Article revealed no instance in
which federal prosecutors claimed the Supremacy Clause exempted them from disci-
plinary action by state bar associations for violations of the ethical rules pertaining to
improper argument and disclosure obligations, which are the focus of this Article.
However, there is an additional hurdle that must be cleared to effectuate state sanc-
tion of a federal prosecutor, even if the Justice Department does not assert the
Supremacy Clause to block state-based discipline of a federal attorney. The Depart-
ment of Justice requires only that its attorneys be licensed to practice in any one of
the United States. United States v. Ferrara, 54 F.3d 825, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citing
relevant statutory provisions). Consequently, a federal attorney may commonly prac-
tice in a federal court of a state in which she is not licensed to practice. This situation
can create interesting "choice of jurisdiction" problems that can impede the prompt
and certain discipline of federal attorneys as the recent case In re Doe, 801 F. Supp.
478 (D.N.M. 1992), illustrates.
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The practical reality is that few prosecutors are ever disciplined by
these regulatory entities. 173 Professor Richard Rosen's study of
prosecutorial Brady violations highlights this problem. Professor Ro-
sen set out to review decisions of state disciplinary commissions re-
garding the prosecutor's duty to disclose evidence to the defense
under Brady v. Maryland. 4 After noting many instances of miscon-
duct in appellate opinions, 175 Professor Rosen expected to locate simi-
larly numerous instances of review by disciplinary bodies.176
Professor Rosen was disappointed. 177 To be sure, many state bar as-
sociations have neither the funds nor the staff to seek out and punish
instances of prosecutorial misconduct.178 Many of these associations
act only on complaint.179 Unfortunately, few defense counsel or
defendants complain to disciplinary bodies about prosecutorial
misconduct' 80
The hole left by the sparse review of prosecutorial conduct by state
disciplinary entities theoretically could be filled by internal review of-
fices. For example, the Department of Justice Office of Professional
Responsibility ("OPR") reviews the conduct of federal prosecutors.18 1
OPR is charged with investigating allegations of misconduct on the
part of Justice Department attorneys, as well as Justice Department
personnel involved in criminal investigations.'l OPR receives com-
plaints from such diverse sources as prison inmates, congressional re-
ferrals, private parties, and Department employees.183 With eight
attorneys to patrol the activities of well over 7500 Department law-
yers, it would be exceedingly generous to say that OPR has its hands
full." OPR recently has been the subject of intense criticism by the
173. See Rosen, supra note 92, at 731-32 (explaining that the persistence of Brady-
type misconduct is due in part to the lack of review by disciplinary bodies of prosecu-
tor's misconduct).
174. Id. The prosecutor's duty under Brady to disclose evidence to the defense ap-
plies to three situations: (1) the use of perjured testimony at trial; (2) nondisclosure
of exculpatory evidence that the defense has specifically asked for, and (3) nondisclo-
sure of exculpatory evidence absent any request (or a general request) by the defense.
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678-81 (1985).
175. See Rosen, supra note 92, at 700-02.
176. ld. at 720.
177. Id. ("What is most surprising about the published reports of disciplinary ac-
tions against prosecutors for Brady-type violations is their limited number.").
178. Id. at 736 n.252 (pointing out that limited resources and staff make it practi-
cally impossible for disciplinary bodies to review reported decisions and institute pro-
ceedings against prosecutors whenever the opinion indicates possible prosecutorial
misconduct).
179. Id. at 716.
180. See id at 730-31, 734-35.
181. Office of Professional Responsibility, 1992 Ann. Rep. to the Att'y Gen. 1
[hereinafter OPR Report].
182. Id. at 1-2.
183. Id. at 4.
184. See Jim McGee, Prosecutor Oversight Is Often Hidden From Sight, Wash. Post,
Jan. 15,1993, at Al. OPR had a staff of six attorneys from 1979 until January of 1993.
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media, members of Congress, and the judiciary for its failure to inves-
tigate promptly incidents of misconduct reported to it.185 Because
federal prosecutors are unlikely to be disciplined by their own internal
ethics police, it is unlikely that the remote threat of OPR reviews pro-
vides a significant deterrent to misconduct.
There is one additional method currently available to "sanction"
prosecutors for misconduct. An appellate court has the power to re-
verse a defendant's conviction and award the defendant a new trial if
the court determines that the prosecutor's misconduct has deprived
the defendant of a constitutional right.18 6 Reversal is not a true sanc-
tion, as it is not specifically directed towards punishing the prosecutor.
Rather, it is a mechanism to ensure that the defendant is afforded the
minimum constitutional protections during the criminal justice pro-
cess. Reversal cannot be counted on as a deterrent to prosecutorial
misconduct. Indeed, it should not be. Whether or not reversal of a
conviction should be "counted" as a sanction for misconduct, reversal
affects the prosecutor's behavior.
Prosecutorial culture dictates that the prosecutor is heavily invested
in winning her case. 87 The prosecutor's professional success inevita-
bly is linked to success at trial and on appeal. Winning trials and ap-
peals is rewarded by promotions over time. Even more important
than office promotions may be the respect and admiration of her
peers that the prosecutor acquires when she wins cases. That a prose-
cutor's professional success is dependent in part on winning trials and
appeals is hardly a remarkable assertion. Prosecutors, after all, work
within the adversarial system. In any given case someone has to win
and someone has to lose. Thus, if a conviction obtained by a prosecu-
tor is reversed on appeal, the prosecutor acquires a check on the loss
side of her record. This check in turn can affect, usually indirectly, the
prosecutor's chances for advancement in the office, raises, and per-
haps even future job opportunities should the prosecutor decide to
leave the prosecutor's office.
The effectiveness of reversal as a sanction is tempered greatly by
the harmless error rule. A conviction will be reversed only if the ap-
pellate court finds the error very serious."8 Not surprisingly, appel-
late courts regularly uphold convictions in the face of prosecutorial
Id. During this time the Department of Justice increased its army of attorneys from
4076 to 7881. In December 1993, Jim McGee reported that OPR increased its staff by
two lawyers. Jim McGee, Justice Dept. Sets Changes on Discipline: Prosecutors' Con-
duct Had Led to Complaints, Wash. Post, Dec. 14, 1993, at Al.
185. Morton, supra note 172, at 1111-13 (discussing criticisms of OPR, as well as
recent reform implemented by OPR).
186. See infra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.
187. Sarah J. Cox, Prosecutorial Discretion: An Overview, 13 Am. Crim. L. Rev.
383, 414 (1976) (emphasizing that prosecutors' emphasis on winning influences charg-
ing decisions).
188. See infra note 221 (listing tests for reviewing improper argument allegations).
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misconduct.'89 Consider a portion of the text of an opinion written by
Judge Posner: "The expansive code of constitutional criminal proce-
dure that the Supreme Court has created in the name of the Constitu-
tion is like the grapes of Tantalus, since the equally expansive
harmless error rule in most cases prevents a criminal defendant from
obtaining any benefit from the code."'19
My review of current mechanisms to control prosecutorial miscon-
duct reveals that these tools are very weak. They probably could be
made stronger. Infusing the professional disciplinary bodies with
more money and resources to identify and sanction prosecutorial mis-
conduct is one way to remedy the inadequate scrutiny that prosecu-
tors currently receive.19' Even more aggressive disciplinary entities
might not sufficiently cabin federal prosecutors, who sometimes prac-
tice before federal courts in states other than the one in which they
are licensed.192 To address this problem, OPR, the federal ethics po-
lice, could be given more resources. Unfortunately, the current ratio
of OPR personnel to reviewed attorneys is about 1 to 1000.193 OPR
would require a very substantial increase in staff just to have a fighting
chance. 94 Another answer might be to encourage trial courts to take
a more aggressive stance towards prosecutors who engage in miscon-
duct before them. Federal courts of appeals have noted that it is the
primary responsibility of trial courts to tame the prosecutors who
practice in their courts. 95 Whatever the solution, it is a common
sense proposition that serious sanctioning of prosecutors on a more
regular basis would affect their conduct and, correspondingly, their
level of misconduct.
Financial incentives could motivate prosecutors to behave ethically.
The hypothesis is simple: Rewarding prosecutors for behaving ethi-
189. See infra notes 221-24 and accompanying text.
190. United States v. Pallais, 921 F.2d 684, 692 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S.
842 (1991).
191. See supra notes 178, 184 (pointing out that professional disciplinary bodies
often are underfunded and understaffed).
192. See supra note 172 (explaining possible jurisdictional problems that may arise
when states seek to enforce state ethics rules against federal prosecutors).
193. As I mentioned earlier, OPR also oversees review of law enforcement agents
under the auspices of the Department of Justice. See supra notes 181-84 and accompa-
nying text.
194. OPR requested 35 positions in 1990, but this request was denied. OPR Report,
supra note 181, at 6 n.4 (1992). Although the Attorney General approved five addi-
tional positions, Congress refused to authorize them. Id. OPR requested two addi-
tional staff persons in 1991, and OMB denied the request. Id. Finally, OPR was
authorized to hire two addition staff people in 1992. Id
195. See, e.g., United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1184 (2d Cir. 1981) ("This
court has repeatedly stated that the task of ensuring that attorneys conduct them-
selves pursuant to recognized ethical precepts falls primarily upon district courts."
(citing Lefrak v. Arabian Amer. Oil Co., 527 F2d 1136,1140 (2d Cir. 1975) and NCK
Org., Ltd. v. Bregman, 542 F.2d 128, 131 (2d Cir. 1976))), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 989
(1982).
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cally will motivate them to do so. Specifically, I propose a financial
incentive scheme that ties financial rewards to the standards of con-
duct embodied in the ethical rules. If a prosecutor is rewarded only if
her behavior comports with these rules, then it is more likely that her
behavior will reflect the standards the rules prescribe. A second hy-
pothesis is that the prosecutor's supervisor, who is responsible for her
compensation, will be more cognizant and less tolerant of improper
behavior if part of the trial prosecutor's compensation is contingent
upon her successfully abiding by rules of proper conduct. This is be-
cause the supervisor will control the trial attorney's compensation
based on the trial attorney's observance of ethical rules.
I propose linking a financial reward, an individual bonus presented
on a case-by-case basis, to appellate review of the defendant's convic-
tion. The onus will fall on the defendant to raise instances of im-
proper behavior on the prosecutor's part, thus initiating scrutiny of
the prosecutor's conduct. If the defendant raises error due to
prosecutorial misconduct, the prosecutor will not be entitled to re-
ceive a bonus unless the appellate court reviewing the merits of the
defendant's contentions in the normal course finds that the prosecutor
behaved properly. If, on the other hand, the defendant does not ap-
peal his conviction, then the prosecutor will receive the bonus because
in such a case it must be assumed that the prosecutor's behavior was
proper. Under the proposal then, whether a prosecutor is rewarded is
contingent upon the appellate court's finding that the prosecutor did
behave properly. By structuring the prosecutor's incentive in this
way, the prosecutor will not be rewarded for improper behavior, even
if the appellate court decides, through the operation of the harmless
error rule, that the conviction should stand. To illustrate the predicted
effects of the reward system, I focus on two types of commonly occur-
ring prosecutorial misconduct: improper argument and failure to dis-
close evidence to the defendant under Brady v. Maryland.196
B. Predicted Effects of the Financial Rewards Model
1. Improper Argument
Prosecutors are prohibited from engaging in improper argument at
trial to prevent them from drawing on the power and status of their
positions as government attorneys and using that power and status to
influence the jury's decision."9 The different types of improper argu-
ment are myriad, including inflammatory remarks, violations of the
defendant's privilege against self-incrimination, references by the
196. Improper argument, which encompasses a broad range of different types of
prosecutorial misconduct, and Brady-type violations are two very common types of
prosecutorial misconduct. The analysis in this Article very possibly can be applied to
other misconduct. I chose these two categories because they are commonly occurring
types of prosecutorial misconduct.
197. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
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prosecutor to matters outside the record, and further breakdowns of
subcategories under the categories listed here.198 This list is by no
means all-inclusive. No matter the category, each type shares the
characteristic of possible prejudice to the defendant's constitutional
rights.
As noted earlier, a prosecutor's conduct is subject to several layers
of regulation. First, the Constitution prohibits certain prosecutorial
misconduct. For example, a prosecutor cannot engage in arguments at
trial that are determined to deprive the defendant of a fair trial guar-
anteed by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution'" and applied to
the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.20 The Constitution simi-
larly proscribes a prosecutor from making arguments that improperly
comment on the defendant's right against self-incrimination. 01 Sec-
ond, prosecutors are subject to standards of professional responsibil-
ity, applicable to them generally as lawyers and specifically as
prosecutors, with respect to the arguments that they make at trial.202
Third, there may be internal constraints on a prosecutor's activities 0 3
This section focuses on the rules of professional responsibility because
these rules satisfy the constitutional standards. It is specifically these
rules that the reward scheme described here seeks to invigorate.
The ABA has published three sources of ethical guidelines for pros-
ecutors regarding improper argument. First is the ABA's Model Code
of Professional Responsibility ("Model Code"). The Model Code
prohibits a lawyer, including a prosecutor, from "allud[ing] to any
matter that he has no reasonable basis to believe is relevant to the
case or that will not be supported by admissible evidence,"' °
"[a]ssert[ing] his personal knowledge of the facts,"" 5 and "assert[ing
his] personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, as to the credibility
of a witness... or as to the guilt or innocence of an accused."2 0 6 A
second source, the ABA Model Rules under the title, "Fairness to Op-
posing Party and Counsel," contains proscriptions similar to those
found in the Model Code.20 7 In addition to the Model Code and the
198. See Gershman, supra note 154, at 10-1 to 10-46, for a more exhaustive list and
descriptive examples of various types of improper argument by prosecutors.
199. See Berger, 295 U.S. at 88 ("[A prosecutor] may strike hard blows, [but] he is
not at liberty to strike foul ones.").
200. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 178-83 (1986) (evaluating an im-
proper prosecutorial comment made in a state trial and upholding defendant's death
sentence).
201. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613 (1965).
202. See infra notes 204, 209 and accompanying text.
203. Federal prosecutors, for example, are subject to investigation by the Depart-
ment of Justice's OPR. See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
204. Model Code, supra note 48, DR 7-106(C)(1).
205. Id. DR 7-106(C)(3).
206. Id. DR 7-106(C)(4).
207. See Model Rules, supra note 44, Rule 3.4 (e) ("A lawyer shall not ... in trial,
allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that
will not be supported by admissible evidence, assert personal knowledge of facts in
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Model Rules, both of which explicitly forbid prosecutors from engag-
ing in argument deemed improper (and therefore, in theory, exposing
a prosecutor who violates the rules to an appropriate sanction by a
state disciplinary commission), there are the ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice ("Standards"). Unlike the Model Code and the
Model Rules, these Standards are intended to be used as a blueprint
for proper behavior rather than as criteria for judicial evaluation of
alleged misconduct. 0 Standard 3-5.8 contains language similar to the
Model Rules and the Model Code, although softer in tone, and the
Standards advise the prosecutor not to make arguments calculated to
appeal to the prejudices of the jury.2 °9 Taken as a group, the Model
Code, the Model Rules, and the Standards provide the prosecutor
with clear guidelines for proper conduct.
Prosecutors do not always observe these clear rules. One of the
most detailed and schizophrenic opinions on this topic is United States
v. Modica.21° In Modica the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
took the time in a per curiam decision to vent its frustration at "the
inability of some federal prosecutors to abide by the well-established
rules limiting the types of comments permissible in summation."12 1'
After detailing the manner in which the prosecutor's statements failed
to comport with the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, the court,
nevertheless, declined to reverse Modica's conviction because it deter-
issue except when testifying as a witness, or state a personal opinion as to ... the
culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an accused. .. ").
208. See Standards for Criminal Justice, supra note 14, Standard 3-1.1, which points
out, however, that the Standards may be relevant in a judicial evaluation of the prose-
cutor's conduct. Such an evaluation might occur during appellate review of a criminal
defendant's contention of improper argument.
209. See id. Standard 3-5.8. This Standard states:
(a) In closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor may argue all reasonable
inferences from evidence in the record. The prosecutor should not inten-
tionally misstate the evidence or mislead the jury as to the inferences it may
draw.
(b) The prosecutor should not express his or her personal belief or opinion
as to the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence or the guilt of the
defendant.
(c) The prosecutor should not make arguments calculated to appeal to the
prejudices of the jury.
(d) The prosecutor should refrain from argument which would divert thejury from its duty to decide the case on the evidence.
In keeping with its stated purpose as a guide, the Prosecution Standards often are
phrased in terms of "A prosecutor should not.. ." in contrast to the Model Code and
the Model Rules, which often are phrased similarly to the following: "A lawyer shall
not.. ." See, e.g., supra note 207 (quoting Model Rule 3.4(e)).
210. 663 F.2d 1173 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 989 (1982).
211. l at 1183-84. The prosecutor in the Modica case vouched for the prosecution
witness's veracity, implied that the witness was threatened by the defendant or some-
one connected with the defendant, and used an argument calculated to inflame the
jury by stating: "Don't let Mr. Modica walk out of this room laughing at you." Id. at
1180. The panel in the Modica case decided that all three of the prosecutor's state-
ments did not meet the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice. Id at 1178-80.
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mined that Modica had not been deprived of a fair trial.2 12 The court
did not stop there. The court recognized that upholding the convic-
tion implicitly communicated some level of approval to the offending
prosecutor, but the court concluded that a better remedy lay in the
trial court's hands.213 The court opined that the trial judge is in the
best position to control the dynamics of the courtroom drama taking
place before her.214 The court then listed a variety of sanctions the
trial court could employ, ranging from in-court reprimands to granting
motions for mistrial.215 Additionally, the court noted that referring
prosecutors to grievance committees for disciplinary actions might
curb misconduct.216 Though its focus was on the control mechanisms
the trial court could use, the Modica panel also said a few words about
the appellate court's role in controlling prosecutorial misconduct: "A
reprimand in a published opinion that names the prosecutor is not
without deterrent effect. '217 The court of appeals opted not to ex-
plore fully the options available to it.
A careful examination of the rhetoric of the Modica case is ex-
tremely useful because it highlights courts' perceived inability to ad-
dress the pervasive problem of improper argument misconduct. The
district court in the Modica case not only failed to reprimand the pros-
ecutor, it overruled defense counsel's objections based on the prose-
cutor's comments. 1s The court of appeals, while trying to address the
problem of misconduct in a serious manner, ultimately softened the
hard edges of the message by refusing to name the prosecutor 2 19 Yet,
in the same breath, the court recognized this tactic as an effective de-
terrent to misconduct. Another indication of the court's perception of
its own helplessness was its failure to consider seriously the sanctions
available to appellate courts for control of prosecutorial misconduct.
That courts seemingly are reluctant to tackle directly the issue of
disciplining prosecutors for misconduct supports the idea that courts
may be more likely to address misconduct if they could do so indi-
rectly. Under the financial incentive system proposed here, the appel-
late court simply provides the information that would allow the
prosecutor's employer to sanction her by withholding the reward if
misconduct occurs. In the Modica case the status of the prosecutor's
reward would be clear. The court stated, "His summation was indeed
212. Id. at 1182. Somewhat ironically, the Modica court remarked: "Yet, just as
this Court has often brandished the sword of reversal only to resheath it in the ab-
sence of substantial -prejudice, here, too, we find no basis to reverse the underlying
conviction." Id.
213. Id. at 1183-85.
214. Id. at 1184-85.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1185.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1181.
219. Id. at 1185 n.7.
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improper in several respects. 2 20 The prosecutor in Modica would not
be rewarded for the conviction obtained in that case, even though the
court upheld the conviction on appeal.
The Modica case, of course, is not unique in its admonishment of
the prosecutor, while upholding the defendant's conviction. All
eleven United States Courts of Appeals and the D.C. Circuit use tests
identical or substantially similar to the Modica test.122  In every case,
the courts first determine whether the prosecutor's remark is im-
proper, and then the courts apply a harmless error review.2z Though
220. Id. at 1178.
221. United States v. Carroll, 26 F.3d 1380, 1383-87 (6th Cir. 1994) (indicating that
the Sixth Circuit has utilized three different tests to evaluate prosecutorial misconduct
in the last two years, but that each test first required the court to determine whether
there was in fact misconduct before making a determination as to the reversibility of
the conviction); United States v. Manning, 23 F.3d 570, 574 (1st Cir. 1994) (listing the
following factors for consideration of whether improper comments warrant a new
trial: (1) the severity of the misconduct; (2) the context in which it occurred; (3)
whether the judge gave any curative instructions; and (4) the strength of the evidence
against the defendant); United States v. Edelin, 996 F.2d 1238, 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1993)(noting that in determining whether to reverse a conviction on grounds of misstate-
ment in closing argument, the court must determine whether the remarks were im-
proper and whether they substantially prejudiced the jury, along with measures taken
to cure the prejudice and the certainty of conviction absent the remarks), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 895 (1994); United States v. Goodapple, 958 F.2d 1402, 1409 (7th Cir. 1992)(stating that first the court determines whether the conduct was improper, and, if so,
the court then determines whether the conduct, in light of the entire record, warrants
reversal); United States v. Lonedog, 929 F.2d 568, 572 (10th Cir.) (same as Goodap-
pie), cert denied, 502 U.S. 854 (1991); United States v. Anchondo-Sandoval, 910 F.2d
1234, 1237 (5th Cir. 1990) (observing that once misconduct is found, the court consid-
ers three factors to determine whether defendant is entitled to reversal); United
States v. Brockington, 849 F.2d 872, 875 (4th Cir. 1988) ("The test for reversible
prosecutorial misconduct generally has two components: that '(1) the prosecutor's
remarks or conduct must in fact have been improper, and (2) such remarks or conduct
must have prejudicially affected the defendant's substantial rights so as to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial.'" (quoting United States v. Hernandez, 779 F.2d 456, 458(8th Cir. 1985))); United States v. Rodriguez, 765 F.2d 1546, 1559 (11th Cir. 1985)(stating that the conduct "must be both improper and prejudicial to a substantial right
of the defendant" to warrant a new trial); United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173,
1181 (2d. Cir. 1981) (listing same factors as Manning but omitting factor (2)), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 989 (1982); United States v. Berry, 627 F.2d 193, 196-97 (9th Cir.
1980) ("Our discussion of his argument follows the three-step analysis outlined in
United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 1980). We address these questions:(1) Did any error or prosecutorial misconduct occur? (2) Were the issues preserved
for appeal? (3) Was the defendant prejudiced? If all are answered affirmatively, we
must reverse."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981); United States v. Homer, 545 F.2d
864, 867-68 (3d Cir. 1976) (stating that once determination of improper argument is
made, court should consider scope of the objectionable comments and their relation-
ship to the entire proceeding, the ameliorative effect of any curative instructions
given, and the strength of the evidence supporting the defendant's conviction), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 954 (1977).
222. See supra note 221. Harmless error review is used if the error was preserved
with an objection. Otherwise, plain error review will be used. See Fed. R. Crim. P.
52(b). "Under this standard, reversal of conviction is justified only if the reviewing
court is convinced that it is necessary in order to avoid an actual miscarriage of jus-
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there is some inconsistency in the various courts' analyses of harmless-
ness,223 the courts are relatively consistent in their determinations of
what constitutes improper comment.2 4 Thus, numerous cases docu-
menting incidents of prosecutorial misconduct provide ready yard-
sticks of proper behavior for judges and prosecutors alike. The
reward system proposed here depends to a much greater extent on the
appellate court's analysis of the impropriety of the prosecutor's mis-
conduct than on an analysis of the harmlessness of identified miscon-
duct. Thus, the fact that many courts are inconsistent in their analysis
of the latter should not affect the efficacy of the reward system.
There are other potential obstacles to the success of linking a re-
ward scheme for prosecutors to appellate review of allegations of er-
ror. These obstacles are addressed in section D. The next subpart
briefly demonstrates the applicability of the reward scheme to ethics
rules regarding the prosecutor's disclosure obligations.
2. Brady-type Violations
The Brady' doctrine requires reversal of a defendant's conviction
for violation of the defendant's due process rights if the prosecutor is
determined to have failed to disclose to the defense evidence that (1)
tends to negate the defendant's guilt or (2) mitigates the defendant's
punishment, if that evidence is material to the defendant's guilt or
punishment.2 6 The Brady doctrine, in turn, forms the basis of a cate-
tice." United States v. Torres, 965 F.2d 303, 307 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 237
(1992).
223. Alschuler, supra note 141, at 658-60.
224. Bennett L. Gershman provides an illustrative example by pointing to two
cases decided by state courts. In each case the prosecutor made improper comments
to the jury that were almost identical. Each court found the prosecutor's remarks
improper, but only one court reversed for error. Bennett L Gershman, Why Prosecu-
tots Misbehave, 22 Crim L. Bull. 131, 139 (1986).
225. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
226. 1& at 87. The Brady decision involved evidence that was relevant only to
whether the defendant would receive the death penalty for a felony murder convic-
tion-that is, evidence that tended to mitigate the defendant's punishment. Id. at 88-
91. The Court derived its ruling in Brady from its decision in Mooney v. Holohan,
294 U.S. 103 (1935), in which the Court held that a prosecutor's use of false testimony
could constitute a due process violation. Brady, 373 U.S. at 86 (citing Mooney, 294
U.S. at 112); see generally LaFave & Israel, supra note 91, § 19.5, at 534 (explaining
that Mooney and its progeny "establish a constitutional obligation of the prosecution
as an entity not to knowingly deceive the jury or allow it to be deceived by prosecu-
tion witnesses"). The Brady Court took the reasoning in Mooney one step further by
stating that the prosecution is equally responsible for deception of the jury when it
withholds evidence requested by the defendant that would tend to exculpate him or
mitigate his punishment, irrespective of whether the withholding results from good or
bad faith. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. In United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985),
the Court expanded the category of evidence included under Brady's umbrella of
exculpatory to include evidence that the defense could use to impeach the prosecu-
tion's witnesses. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676-77. In addition, the Bagley Court reformu-
lated the materiality standard of Brady from a test that incorporated different levels
of scrutiny depending on the type of request from the defense, id. at 675-76, to the
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gory of rules of professional responsibility applicable only to prosecu-
tors because the Brady rule itself applies exclusively to prosecutors.
Because one contention of this Article is that lax enforcement of the
disciplinary rules supporting the Brady doctrine leads to inadequate
respect for these rules by prosecutors, I will focus on the rules rather
than the constitutional doctrine itself.
The Model Code devotes one disciplinary rule entirely to the duties
of the public prosecutor. This rule was promulgated after the
Supreme Court's decision in Brady.2 7 Disciplinary Rule 7-103(B) re-
quires a prosecutor to make "timely disclosure to counsel for the de-
fendant, or to the defendant if he has no counsel, of the existence of
evidence, known to the prosecutor or other government lawyer, that
tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the degree of the
offense, or reduce the punishment."' ' 8 The later-developed Model
Rules contain a corollary to Disciplinary Rule 7-103(B) at Rule 3.8(d),
which is substantially similar to Disciplinary Rule 7-103(B) except that
Rule 3.8(d) makes clear that the prosecutor should turn over evidence
to the defense rather than simply notify the defense of the existence of
evidence.2 9 The rule also recognizes that a prosecutor may seek a
protective order to relieve herself of the responsibility of turning over
to the defendant information that could result in substantial harm to
an individual or to the public.230
Both Disciplinary Rule 7-103(B) and Model Rule 3.8(d) require the
prosecutor to turn over evidence that tends to negate the defendant's
guilt or mitigates the defendant's punishment without the limitation
that the evidence also be material. The constitutional Brady doctrine,
on the other hand, provides that a defendant's conviction will be over-
turned only if the favorable evidence withheld by the prosecution is
material.23 1 In this way the Brady doctrine operates much like a
more flexible standard used today. Under this standard, nondisclosed evidence that
exculpates the defendant's guilt or mitigates his punishment is considered material
only if "there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 682. The
Bagley majority looked to the definition of "reasonable probability" set out in Strick-
land v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)-" 'probability sufficient to undermine confi-
dence in the outcome.'" Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 66).
227. The ABA Model Code became effective in 1970. Stephen Gillers & Roy D.
Simon, Jr., Regulation of Lawyers: Statutes and Standards at x (1994). Brady was
decided in 1963. 373 U.S. at 83.
228. Model Code, supra note 48, DR 7-103(B).
229. Model Rules, supra note 44, Rule 3.8(d).
230. Id Rule 3.8(d) cmt. 3 ("The prosecutor in a criminal case shall... make timely
disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that
tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection
with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating
information known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this
responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal ....").
231. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The materiality concept of the Brady
doctrine was developed in United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)
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harmless error rule for Brady-type violations. This is an important
point. A significant gap exists between the performance the Constitu-
tion requires of a prosecutor and the higher standard compelled by
the rules of professional responsibility. This gap is similar to the gap
between the constitutional requirements regarding the prosecutor's
arguments to the jury and the rules of professional responsibility
prohibiting such conduct explained above. Reported cases indicate
that instances of "Brady-type"" misconduct, like instances of im-
proper argument, frequently occurP33 The frequency of Brady-type
misconduct, like the frequency of improper argument, likely is due in
part to the lack of effective sanctions for such conduct.
Professor Richard Rosen has studied the problem created by the
lack of effective sanctions by disciplinary bodies for a prosecutor's
failure to observe rules of professional responsibility. Professor Ro-
sen reviewed cases covering a fairly broad range of Brady-type mis-
conduct-from instances in which the prosecutor deliberately
concealed evidence that another suspect committed the crime instead
of the defendant to cases in which the defense failed to ask a prosecu-
tion witness specifically about any agreements that wvitness had with
the government.' Although Rosen catalogued numerous cases, it
must be noted that many, if not most, instances of Brady-type miscon-
duct are discovered only after the trial is over. Proceedings involving
Brady-type misconduct often are proceedings for post-conviction re-
lief rather than direct appeals23-5 Consequently, it is probably fair to
say that many instances of Brady-type misconduct are never discov-
ered and hence never reported. The fact that many instances of
Brady-type misconduct are never discovered supports more strict en-
forcement of rules prohibiting such conduct in the few cases in which
the misconduct comes to light.
("[Elvidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evi-
dence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confi-
dence in the outcome.").
232. I borrow this term from Richard Rosen who describes "Brady-type" miscon-
duct as a prosecutor's failure to abide by ethical rules based on the Brady doctrine,
even when the prosecutor's failure to turn over Brady evidence does not rise to con-
stitutional proportions because the evidence is not considered material to the defend-
ant's guilt or punishment. Rosen, supra note 92, at 696. Under this nomenclature, a
technical Brady violation occurs only when the prosecutor's failure to disclose evi-
dence favorable to the defense results in a violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.
233. See id. at 697-703 (citing and discussing scores of cases involving Brady
violations).
234. See id. 700-03.
235. This is true because defendants often do not discover that the prosecution
withheld favorable evidence until such evidence is revealed outside the context of the
defendant's trial, such as in the trial of a codefendant or through a Freedom of Infor-
mation Act request.
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The financial reward system applied above to improper argument
could also be applied in the disclosure context. Prosecutors could be
rewarded for their adherence to rules of professional responsibility
that mandate disclosure of favorable evidence to the defense. The re-
ward could be linked to review of the defense's allegations of Brady-
type misconduct. The procedure would be similar to the review pro-
cedure for allegations of improper argument described above. A
prosecutor would receive a reward for proper behavior only if a re-
viewing court finds that the prosecution did not fail to turn over evi-
dence that was favorable to the defense, whether or not the reviewing
court ultimately finds that the favorable evidence was material. A
finding of materiality, of course, justifies a new trial in much the same
way that a finding of substantial prejudice to the defendant resulting
from the prosecutor's improper comment justifies a new trial.23 6
C. The Role of Appellate Courts
Prosecutors rarely are sanctioned for their failure to observe the
rules of professional responsibility pertaining to improper argument
or Brady-type violations that hold them to a higher standard than do
the constitutional rules on these issues. Appellate courts seldom im-
pose the quasi sanction of reversal because criminal defendants must
clear the almost insurmountable hurdle of the harmless error rule on
appeal. Relatively toothless enforcement of rules prohibiting
prosecutorial misconduct results from the conflation of the most effec-
tive "sanction" currently utilized by the courts to deter prosecutorial
misconduct with constitutional standards, which specify only mini-
mum requirements for fair trials.
To give the tiger teeth, courts must make a greater effort to separate
the ethical requirements imposed on a prosecutor's conduct from
what is required of the prosecutor to ensure that a defendant receives
a trial that comports with constitutional minimums. Until these stan-
dards are cleaved apart, prosecutors will have very little incentive to
achieve higher standards of ethical behavior. Thus, an important key
to the efficacy of the reward system I propose is the appellate courts'
response to the system. The desired response of prosecutors to the
reward for good behavior depends on whether the appellate court re-
viewing allegations of misconduct on appeal actually engages in that
review and whether the review is sufficiently rigorous enough to pro-
vide the target prosecutor's superiors with information on which to
base a reward.
The linchpin of my argument is that courts of appeals must divorce
constitutional standards from higher ethical standards. The link be-
tween the reward system proposed here and review of prosecutorial
236. See Rosen, supra note 92, at 705 & n.66; Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking
Harmless Constitutional Error, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 79, 85 & n.31 (1988).
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misconduct will achieve the greatest efficacy if an appellate court's
notions of the proper ethical behavior of a prosecutor in the improper
argument and disclosure contexts are well developed and distinct from
that court's notion of the minimally adequate-constitutional-
behavior.
Appellate courts' conceptions of proper ethical notions already are
developed and distinct from their views of minimally adequate and
constitutional behavior. The separate notions are, in fact, part and
parcel of the tests that the appellate courts use to review allegations of
trial error based on misconduct. The tests used by the various courts
of appeals require the courts to first determine whether the prosecu-
tor behaved in a manner compliant with ethical rules before applying
a harmless error analysis. That is, the courts determine whether the
prosecutor's comment was improper before deciding whether the re-
mark, if improper, deprived the defendant of a fair trial. The analysis
that the courts currently engage in mirrors the analysis the financial
reward proposal here requires in order for the proposal to be most
effective.
D. Possible Objections
1. Nonrigorous Appellate Review
One problem that may undercut the effectiveness of the proposed
financial incentive system is that courts do not consistently apply the
step-by-step analysis that would generate the necessary information
for supervising prosecutors to make decisions about rewards. For ex-
ample, sometimes when dissecting Brady-type misconduct allegations,
a court will pass over the first factors of the test dealing with suppres-
sion and favorability and simply state that the evidence the defendant
alleges he was denied is not material. 3 7 The problem of nonrigorous
analysis of defendant's allegations on appeal seems to be more fre-
quent in the case of Brady-type allegations than in improper argument
allegations, although the problem is not unknown in that context.238
237. See Nelson v. Nagle, 995 F.2d 1549, 1555 (11th Cir. 1993) ("We will not address
the first two prongs of the [Brady] test because we find that the evidence was not
material .... "); Ruff v. Armontrout, 993 F.2d 639, 641 (8th Cir. 1993) (same holding
as in Nelson). But see United States v. Douglas, 874 F2d 1145, 1163 (7th Cir.) (em-
phasizing that although the trial judge essentially collapsed the two-part test for anal-
ysis of Brady-type misconduct, a court ideally should uarticulate findings under both
prongs of the Brady-Bagley test"), cerL denied, 493 U.S. 841 (1989).
238. See, e.g., United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354, 1372 (11th Cir.
1994) ("We need not decide whether the prosecutor's question ... was improper
[vouching] because even if it was, that error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt."). The cases in which collapse of the test for improper argument are likely to
be seen are those cases in which the defendant failed to object at trial, so that appel-
late court review is under a plain error standard rather than a harmless error analysis.
See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 8 F.3d 1552, 1561 (11th Cir. 1993) ("Without decid-
ing whether the argument in this case was improper, we conclude that it did not con-
stitute plain error.").
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It is very difficult to make a claim about the frequency with which this
occurs. My review of many of these cases at the federal level leads me
to be sufficiently confident that in the substantial majority of cases,
appellate courts would engage in an analysis that is rigorous enough to
provide the prosecutor's superiors with enough information to make a
decision regarding the prosecutor's reward.
To the extent that courts do not engage in sufficiently rigorous anal-
ysis, the existence of a reward system for good behavior, of which
judges obviously would be aware, would provide the judges with an
incentive to engage in a more exacting level of review of prosecutorial
misconduct. Court statements concerning the ineffectiveness of the
sanctions currently employed support the argument that courts would
be willing to expend a very small amount of additional time to review
cases involving misconduct in greater detail. Courts will be aware that
the detail will make it possible for the prosecutor's superiors to sanc-
tion the attorney for misconduct in a manner that the courts could not,
or have not been willing to, sanction.
2. Court Bias in Favor of Prosecutors
Appellate courts may be reluctant to engage in rigorous review of
misconduct allegations because they may not want to shoulder direct
responsibility for withholding rewards from prosecutors. Prosecutors,
both at the federal and state level, often are repeat players in appel-
late tribunals. Moreover, appellate judges are sometimes former pros-
ecutors. These current and historical relationships might support an
argument that appellate courts will be reluctant to impose sanctions
on prosecutors, even indirectly, through a more strict review of
prosecutorial misconduct allegations on appeal. While familiar rela-
tionships might present less than optimum conditions for review, I
doubt these relationships would cause the system to be completely
undermined. To give this argument that much credence assumes that
appellate courts care much less about deterring ethical violations of
prosecutors than they care about rewarding prosecutors.
It would be very difficult for appellate courts to justify engaging in
substantially less rigorous review than these courts currently engage.
Thus, the most likely result of a familiarity problem is that rigor at
much higher levels than we currently have may not be attained. That
would not be a bad state of affairs, as courts currently provide a sub-
stantial amount of information in their opinions on which to base a
reward. If the courts, in an obvious manner, did anything less than
follow the rules that the courts have set up for reviewing allegations of
prosecutorial misconduct, the courts would undermine judicial integ-
rity and public confidence in the criminal justice system.
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3. Delay of Review
The length of time it takes for an appellate court to review the de-
fendant's claims also could be a problem for the reward system. If too
much time elapses between the prosecutor's trial conduct and its re-
view on appeal, the motivating force of the reward for good behavior
may decay. Decay may result because the prosecutor will not per-
ceive a very strong link between her behavior and the reward if the
interval before review is lengthy. Even worse, the prosecutor may
have left for new job opportunities outside the office. Either way, the
effect of the reward would be diminished.
Limiting the reward system to cases in which errors are brought up
on direct review would ameliorate some of the decay effects that inev-
itably would be associated with a system that included collateral ap-
peals since collateral appeals sometimes take several years to be
resolved.3 9 Statistics compiled by the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts ("Administrative Office") reveal that the time
lag between filing of notice of appeal to final disposition is not so long
that a link between appellate review and a reward would be prepos-
terous. For the twelve month period ending June 30, 1994, the median
time interval between filing notice to final disposition was as high as
16.7 months in the District of Columbia and Eleventh Circuits.24 0
However, three Circuits, the Second, Third, and Eighth, had disposi-
tion time intervals of less than nine months for the same period.24 1
Both the mean and median for all twelve circuits was close to eleven
months;.242
The Administrative Office data, combined with data concerning the
length of service of the average federal prosecutor, suggest rewards
linked to appellate review could operate effectively. The median ap-
pellate disposition time is long enough to accommodate most federal
prosecutors, who are required to pledge at least four years of service.
Many Assistant U.S. Attorneys stay longer.3
239. I performed an informal survey by selecting all of the pretrial suppression
cases decided by the U.S. courts of appeals between 1990 and 1993. During this time
period direct appeals ranged from about 5 months to 6 years from indictment to ap-
pellate decision, while collateral appeals ranged from 8 to 17 years.
240. Telecopy from Gwendolyn Coleman, Technical Information Specialist, Statis-
tics Division, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, to Tracey L Meares, Assistant Profes-
sor, University of Chicago Law School (Sept. 16, 1994) (reprinting tbL 4, U.S. Court
of Appeals, Median Tune Intervals in Cases Terminated After Hearing or Submis-
sion) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
241. Id.
242. See id.
243. Forty percent of the Assistant U.S. Attorneys in the U.S. Attorneys Office for
the Northern District of Illinois had been with the office for more than four years in
1992. See 1992 U.S. Att'y N.D. Ill. Ann. Rep. 137-42. I should note, however, that
while I have targeted this proposal to federal prosecutors, I have argued that the
proposal also may be applicable to state prosecutors. Two factors potentially could
make application of this proposal to state prosecutors very problematic. First, there
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4. Prosecutorial Conflicts on Appeal
The potential for conflict of interest on the prosecutor's part might
pose problems for a reward system based on appellate review. The
system specifies that the prosecutor will fail to receive a reward only if
the appellate court finds her conduct to be improper, regardless of
whether the improper conduct is later found to be harmless. Because
the prosecutor in a world without rewards still can win a case when
her behavior is wrongful, no real harm (in the form of reversal) results
if she admits an error to the appellate court so long as her error was
not harmful. The world of rewards, on the other hand, accommodates
sanction of the prosecutor without resort to the extreme sanction of
reversal. Because denial of a reward for a conviction will be a signifi-
cant "intermediate sanction" as compared to reversal, a prosecutor
may not readily admit that she has done wrong. To do so would invite
the intermediate sanction. One possible consequence, then, of an in-
dividual reward system keyed to appeals is that the prosecutor may
deny any wrongdoing at all on appeal, as opposed to serving the gov-
ermnent's broader interest in preserving the ethics of the office by
admitting error on appeal while arguing that the error was harmless.
Interestingly, the impact of the prosecutor's reluctance to admit her
own wrongdoing should differ depending on whether the error alleged
is the improper argument type or the Brady-type. In the improper
argument context, there is little reason to be concerned about the con-
sequences of the prosecutor's failure to admit her own wrongdoing.
There should be a record to provide the appellate court with material
for review since these errors occur at trial. The nature of this type of
misconduct makes it unlikely that detection would be difficult; hence,
there is little need to rely on the prosecutor's admissions.
The Brady context is somewhat different. In order to show that
Brady-type misconduct has occurred, the defendant must allege that
the prosecution suppressed favorable evidence. 24 If the prosecutor
admits suppression, the defendant's case obviously is that much easier.
In the current system there is no obvious disincentive for a prosecutor
to admit her mistake, so long as the error is harmless. She still will
obtain a conviction. But in the world of rewards, the prosecutor will
know that if she admits an error, she will not capture a reward even if
the error turns out to be harmless. Thus, the specter of losing the
reward might induce the prosecutor to cover-up wrongdoing.
often is high turnover of personnel in state prosecuting offices. Second, the time in-
terval between conviction and a decision on direct appeal in the state system may
dwarf even the seemingly long time to disposition in the D.C. and Eleventh Circuits.
In recognition of this latter issue, The MacArthur Justice Center at the Mandel Legal
Aid Clinic filed a class action on behalf of persons convicted of state felonies whose
appeals have been pending for over a year with no brief filed. See United States ex rel.
Green v. Peters, 153 F.R.D. 615, 617 (N.D. IM. 1994).
244. See supra text accompanying note 226 (setting out prongs of the Brady test).
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The previous analysis assumes, however, that a prosecutor would
not be motivated to produce the evidence initially by the possibility, if
the not probability, of being rewarded for doing so. Justice White,
joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, reasoned in his concurrence
to the Imbler decision that sanctions for failure to produce evidence
initially would induce the opposite response from prosecutors. 245 Jus-
tice White argued that a prosecutor should not be protected by abso-
lute immunity from suits based on claims of unconstitutional
suppression of evidence because such a rule would injure the judicial
process and interfere with Congress' purpose in enacting 42 U.S.C.
§ 19831 Justice White looked to the contours of absolute immunity
granted to prosecutors at common law to provide part of the basis for
his argument that civil claims brought for the prosecutor's use of false
testimony should be treated differently from suits charging the prose-
cutor with unconstitutional suppression of evidence.247 Justice White
also looked to the effects of granting prosecutors absolute immunity
from suits charging Brady violations,2 and it is this analysis that is
pertinent to the assessment of a reward scheme tied to appellate eval-
uation of Brady-type errors. After noting that the single justification
for granting prosecutors absolute immunity from liability for defama-
tion is to encourage prosecutors to bring information to the court to
resolve a criminal case,24 9 Justice White went on to explain that
"[i]mmunity from a suit based upon a claim that the prosecutor sup-
pressed or withheld evidence would discourage precisely the disclo-
sure of evidence sought.., by the rule granting prosecutors immunity
from defamation suits. Denial of immunity for unconstitutional with-
holding of evidence would encourage such disclosure."' 0 The reason-
ing behind Justice White's statement is simple: If prosecutors are
liable for unconstitutional withholding, the specter of civil suits should
provide them with an incentive to disclose in the first instance. Simi-
larly, by denying prosecutors a reward for their failure to disclose to
defendants favorable evidence prior to trial, the incentive scheme de-
scribed here hopes to encourage disclosure.
5. Case Disposition by Plea
One final possible objection to this scheme that cannot be over-
looked is the fact that in a great majority of criminal cases review is
unattainable, as eighty to ninety percent of criminal cases are resolved
by pleas."' Most misconduct leading to pleas never comes to the ap-
245. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 441-42 (1976) (White, J., concurring).
246. Id. at 433 (White, J., concurring).
247. Id. (White, J., concurring).
248. Id- at 441-44 (White, J., concurring).
249. Id. at 442 (White, J., concurring).
250. Id. at 443 (White, J., concurring).
251. See supra note 43.
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pellate court's attention.252 Of course, that many cases are resolved
by pleas would not undermine the benefits of the reward system
designed to deter improper argument, for this type of error occurs
only at trial. The issue with respect to disclosure, however, is some-
what more difficult to unpack.
The test for a Brady violation is an outcome-determinative test.
According to the test set out in Bagley, a court reviewing a Brady
claim must ask, after determining that the evidence in question is both
suppressed and favorable, "Would this evidence have made a differ-
ence at the proceeding? '' 253 The rule in Bagley is framed around the
term "proceeding," which does not automatically preclude the appli-
cations of Brady's rule to proceedings other than the trial setting, such
as pleas. Brady itself applied to the sentencing stage, although there
was a jury trial in that case.2 4 Defendants electing to go to trial are
allowed on appeal to challenge the substance of their convictions, pro-
vided objections are properly preserved.255 But if a defendant pleads
guilty, the plea will withstand almost any challenge on appeal, so long
as the plea is intelligent and voluntary.5 6 Even so, at least three fed-
eral courts of appeals have noted that the Brady doctrine applies to
guilty pleas as well as to trials and sentencing,257 indicating that it is
possible for a defendant who pleads guilty to obtain appellate review
of his Brady claims and, as a consequence, provide the appellate court
with an opportunity to generate the information necessary for the
prosecutor's supervisor to make a decision regarding the prosecutor's
reward as described here.
As a practical matter, it might be somewhat difficult to imagine
many contexts in which such an appeal would be possible, despite
opinions indicating that at least three federal circuits would accept
Brady challenges to conviction obtained by pleas. The most likely
252. See infra note 256.
253. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
254. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 88-91 (1963).
255. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) (noting, however, that plain error review may be
used even though objections were not brought to the court's attention).
256. The Supreme Court's Brady trilogy of cases, Parker v. North Carolina, 397
U.S. 790 (1970), McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), and Brady v. United
States. 397 U.S. 742 (1970), hold that if the defendant pleads guilty voluntarily and
intelligently, direct inquiry into the merits of the claimed antecedent constitutional
violations is foreclosed. It is worth noting that the Court's assessment of voluntari-
ness of a plea is dependent on the presence of counsel for the defendant and also on
the effectiveness of counsel. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56, 58-60 (1985).
257. See White v. United States, 858 F.2d 416, 421-22 (8th Cir. 1988) (discussing the
applicability of Brady to an Alford plea (citing Campbell v. Marshall, 769 F.2d 314
(6th Cir. 1985)), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1029 (1989); Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312,
1320 (2d Cir.) ("[A] guilty plea that was 'knowing' and 'intelligent' may be vulnerable
to challenge if it was entered without knowledge of material evidence withheld by the
prosecution."), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 890 (1988). The Campbell case ultimately is
more equivocal than either White or Miller about Brady's effect on the validity of a
plea. See Campbell, 769 F.2d at 322.
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context would be a case in which the defendant agreed to an Alford" s
plea. Because the essence of an Alford plea is that a defendant pleads
guilty on the basis of his assessment of the prosecution's evidence
against him, while maintaining his innocence, the defendant theoreti-
cally should be able to argue on appeal that the plea was not voluntary
if the prosecution withheld evidence that would have made him
change his assessment. A court, moreover, may be convinced after
the revelation of suppressed, favorable evidence that there no longer
is a factual basis for the defendant's Alford plea3. 59 Typically, how-
ever, Alford pleas are rare, and many defendants admit in open court
to committing the charged offense. Under current rules it would be
exceedingly difficult in the usual case for a defendant to argue that his
plea was rendered unintelligent and involuntary on the basis of the
prosecutor's suppression of favorable evidence. Even excluding the
applicability of the reward system keyed to appellate review for nu-
merous cases, the typical defendant is not without protection in the
world with rewards that I describe here. The reward system described
in part I is designed to influence the prosecutor's charging discretion
as well as deter misconduct at trial, so the typical defendant who
pleads guilty should enjoy the benefits of the rewards system pro-
duced at the beginning of the process though he may elect to waive his
right to trial.
I have offered the previous explication of possible objections to
highlight potential weaknesses of the plan I propose. However, I do
not think any of the weaknesses are great enough to undermine the
entire system. Rather, the weaknesses should be evaluated in rela-
tionship to the weaknesses of existing methods for combating
prosecutorial misconduct. It is extremely difficult to argue that any of
the weaknesses I have pointed out makes the scheme I propose any
less effective than existing methods of enforcement. Furthermore, I
believe that I have shown that rewards could be a useful addition to
the limited arsenal of tools available to combat prosecutorial
misconduct.
CONCLUSION
I have explained how rewards, specifically financial rewards, could
be used to shape a public prosecutor's behavior in desired ways. Theinnovation I propose is that financial rewards could be used to achieve
nuanced outcomes pertaining to prosecutorial charging decisions and
the prosecutor's trial conduct. Rather than being motivated to accu-
mulate convictions because they are paid to accumulate them, I argue
that rewards could be used to motivate prosecutors to limit their
258. In North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), the Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of a guilty plea by a defendant who maintains his innocence so
long as there is a factual basis for the plea.
259. See Fed. R. Cim. P. 11(f).
1995]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
charging discretion in ways that benefit criminal defendants. In turn,
these defendants will be able to make decisions about relinquishing
their constitutional rights in a more meaningfully voluntary and intel-
ligent manner. Moreover, I argue that shaping a prosecutor's discre-
tion with rewards also will benefit the public by encouraging the
prosecutor to make a charging decision at the outset of the case that
reflects the evidence and that will stick, because the prosecutor will be
reluctant to bargain down.
In a similar vein I propose that financial incentives can be used to
motivate public prosecutors to adhere to ethical rules, specifically
rules prohibiting prosecutors from making improper arguments at
trial and from failing to disclose to the defense evidence favorable to
it. The primary benefit of rewarding prosecutors to adhere to ethical
rules is that the current system of sanctions for misconduct rarely is
enforced, leaving only standards which protect the defendant's consti-
tutional rights. These standards guarantee the defendant only a fair
trial, not a perfect one. They are not designed to regulate prosecutors,
yet the Constitution in practice seems to be the primary reference of
regulation of prosecutorial conduct. Clearly, using the Constitution as
the yardstick to measure proper prosecutorial behavior is inadequate.
Financial rewards could provide prosecutors with an incentive to
achieve higher standards of conduct, embodied in ethical rules, with
the constitutional standards providing, as they should, a floor. Even if
the reward system outlined here is not efficacious, the analysis in this
Article clearly indicates that the current enforcement system is broken
and needs to be changed.
The most important feature of this proposal is the fact that it recog-
nizes a primary characteristic of existing prosecutorial culture (the de-
sire to win) and works with that characteristic to motivate prosecutors
to internalize additional values. The foundation for this proposal does
not rest on the assumption that prosecutors will respond to the reward
system because they desire more money. Instead, the proposal rests
on the notion that a prosecutor's desire to achieve status and compete
with her colleagues will motivate her to alter charging practices and
adhere to ethical rules because these behaviors will result in greater
recognition and rewards. It is no easy task to strike a balance between
the amount of reward necessary to achieve a good signaling effect of
proper values to prosecutors and the amount of reward that will sim-
ply overcome the signaling function and replace it with an inducement
to seek pure financial gains. Such a balancing act requires a careful
and thoughtful assessment of the proper goals of the public prosecutor
and the prosecutor's role in the criminal justice system. This Article is
a start.
It is no doubt true that the devil is in the details. I have not tried to
articulate the microscopic details of a system of rewards. I have in-
stead tried as a first step to outline more generally how financial re-
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wards could be used for agents of the public sector. Prosecutors have
a unique culture that contributes to the problems we perceive in their
exercise of discretion and in their trial conduct. Rewards can be used
to influence this culture by capitalizing on the values such as winning
and competition that prosecutors already think are important and har-
nessing these values to motivate prosecutors to achieve good
behavior.

